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I. INTRODUCTION
Insider trading has presented some of the most unsettled and
contentious issues of corporate law. These issues have been particu-
larly difficult because often it has not even been clear whether the law
forbids those who possess material nonpublic information to trade
securities. Even as commentators have debated whether insider
trading ought to be forbidden, the courts have disagreed on the more
basic question of when and whether such trading is, in fact,
forbidden.,
The law governing insider trading has been unclear because
the scope of the SEC's authority to regulate insider trading has been
unclear. For a while, courts uniformly held that section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act2 (the "Exchange Act") authorizes the SEC to
forbid trading by those in possession of misappropriated material
nonpublic information, and that section 14(e) of the Exchange Act3
authorizes the Commission to forbid trading on the basis of any mate-
rial nonpublic information about tender offers.4 However, two circuit
courts of appeal subsequently rejected this precedent and held that
the Commission could not forbid trading on the basis of
misappropriated information or prohibit informed trading in the
context of tender offers.5 Earlier this year, in United States v.
O'Hagan,6 the Supreme Court held that (1) a person who trades
securities for personal profit using confidential information
misappropriated in breach of a fiduciary duty to the source of the
information violates section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 7 and (2) at least
insofar as the question had been presented to the Court, the SEC did
1. See generally C. Edward Fletcher, Materials on the Law of Insider Trading (Carolina
Academic Press, 1991); Donald C. Langevoort, Insider Trading: Regulation, Enforcement &
Prevention (Clark Boardman Callaghan, 1996); Louis Loss and Joel Seligman, 7-8 Securities
Regulation 3404-3770 (Little, Brown, 3d ed. 1992 & Supp. 1996); William K. S. Wang and Marc I.
Steinberg, Insider Trading 1-117 (Little, Brown, 1996).
2. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994).
3. Id. § 78n(e).
4. See Part II.B (showing that section 14(e) allows the SEC to adopt a rule prohibiting
trading while in possession of material nonpublic information dealing with tender offers).
Another question is whether the prohibitions against insider trading come into play only when
nonpublic information motivates the trade-that is, the trader trades on the basis of the infor-
mation-or whether it is enough that the trader possesses such information. See Langevoort,
Insider Trading § 3.04 (cited in note 1) (discussing whether motivation is relevant to insider
training analysis). I take no position on that question here.
5. United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612, 624-27 (8th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 1997 U.S. LEXIS
4033 (June 25, 1997); United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 949-53 (4th Cir. 1995). These cases
are discussed in Part H.C.
6. 1997 U.S. LEXIS 4033.
7. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1996).
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not exceed its rulemaking authority under section 14(e) when it
adopted rule 14e-3,8 which establishes a sort of parity-of-information
regime for trading in connection with tender offers.
Although the Court's opinion in O'Hagan strongly endorsed the
SEC's regulation of insider trading,9 it left several important questions
unanswered. For example, it is not entirely clear what sort of
confidential relationship creates a duty of loyalty protected by section
10(b). Defendants presumably will argue that the breach of a
noncommercial confidential relationship, such as that between a
therapist and patient or between family members, does not suffice to
establish securities fraud. In addition, the Court explicitly refrained
from deciding whether rule 14e-3 is valid insofar as it prohibits
trading in advance of a tender offer. A final question is whether the
Court's holding was correct. Two courts of appeal had construed
section 10(b) and rule 14e-3 much more narrowly, as had numerous
academic commentators. Moreover, three justices dissented from
parts of the majority's opinion in O'Hagan, and Justice Thomas, joined
by the Chief Justice, strenuously argued that neither the
misappropriation theory nor rule 14e-3 was consistent with the
Exchange Act.
This Article is about a provision of the Insider Trading and
Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 ("the 1988 Act")10 that
directly addressed the validity of rule 14e-3 and the misappropriation
doctrine, and the parameters of the latter. In the 1988 Act, Congress
declared its finding that the "rules and regulations of the Securities
and Exchange Commission under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934... governing trading while in possession of material, nonpublic
information are, as required by such Act, necessary and appropriate in
the public interest and for the protection of investors." The statute
further provided that the SEC had "enforced such rules and regula-
tions vigorously, effectively, and fairly.""
8. Id. § 240.14e-3.
9. See 1997 U.S. LEXIS 4033 at *31. The Court stated:
The [misappropriation] theory is ... well-tuned to an animating purpose of the Exchange
Act: to insure honest securities markets and thereby promote investor confidence ....
Although informational disparity is inevitable in the securities markets, investors likely
would hesitate to venture their capital in a market where trading based on misappropri-
ated nonpublic information is unchecked by law. An investor's informational disadvan-
tage vis-h-vis a misappropriator with material, nonpublic information stems from con-
trivance, not luck; it is a disadvantage that cannot be overcome with research or skill.
10. Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1994).
11. 1988 Act § 2 (cited in note 10) (appended to 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1 (1994)). The findings are
quoted in full in the text accompanying note 85.
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Inasmuch as the Exchange Act authorizes the SEC to promul-
gate necessary and appropriate rules and the 1988 Act says that the
SEC's insider trading rules are necessary and appropriate, on first
reading these findings seem to settle the matter and establish that the
SEC's insider trading initiatives are within its statutory authority.
Surprisingly, however, they have not figured at all in the debate over
the validity of the SEC rules.12 Thus, one purpose of this Article is
simply to highlight their existence.
If everyone has ignored a nine-year-old statute that purported
to establish the validity of the rules against insider trading, one might
wonder whether the findings really established their validity. As a
practical matter, they did not, for the validity of the SEC's rulemaking
initiatives remained in doubt after the statute was enacted, and the
courts thai addressed their legitimacy essentially ignored the 1988
Act's findings. The Supreme Court noted the existence of the findings
in O'Hagan, but since it upheld the misappropriation theory and rule
14e-3 on the basis of sections 10(b) and 14(e), the Court chose not to
discuss the 1988 Act.13 Inasmuch as the Court's holding is largely
consistent with the dictates of the 1988 Act, this omission may have
been of little moment, and perhaps the findings influenced the ulti-
mate decisions of the majority. However, the same cannot be said of
the lower courts that rejected the misappropriation theory and rule
14e-3 without mentioning the findings, nor of the dissenting Justices
in O'Hagan, who did not mention the findings.
The other purpose of this Article is to identify the implications
of the 1988 Act for the law of insider trading, and, more generally, to
12. In O'Hagan, the Supreme Court noted that the government argued that Congress con-
firmed the validity of the misappropriation theory and rule 14e-3 in these findings. 1997 U.S.
LEXIS 4033 at n.11. However, the Court explained that it did not address the 1988 Act since it
upheld the misappropriation theory and rule 14e-3 on the basis of sections 10(b) and 14(e). Id. at
n.22. The dissenting opinions did not mention the findings. I am not aware of any extended
discussion of the findings. The only other published references to these findings outside of the
1988 Act and its legislative history seem to be in SEC v. Peters, 978 F.2d 1162, 1167 (10th Cir.
1992), and in a few law review articles. In Peters, which arose before the findings were enacted,
the court said that the findings supported its holding that rule 14e-3 was valid. Id. The articles
each mention the findings briefly and all suggest that they indicated congressional support or
ratification of the misappropriation doctrine and/or rule 14e-3. See Stephen M. Bainbridge,
Incorporating State Law Fiduciary Duties into the Federal Insider Trading Prohibition, 52 Wash.
& Lee L. Rev. 1189, 1232-33 (1995); Howard M. Friedman, The Insider Trading and Securities
Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, 68 N.C. L. Rev. 465, 474-75 (1990); Stuart J. Kaswell, An
Insider's View of the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, 45 Bus. Law.
145, 157-58 (1989); Steve Thel, The Genius of Section 16: Regulating the Management of Publicly
Held Companies, 42 Hastings L. J. 391, 414 n.70 (1991); Steve Thel, The Original Conception of
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 385, 464 n.362 (1990); Steve Thel,
Section 20(d) of the Securities Exchange Act, 69 N.C. L. Rev. 1261, 1268 (1991).
13. 1997 U.S. LEXIS 4033 at nn.11, 22.
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begin to explore the use of statutory law finding as a technique for
establishing substantive law. Given the heat of the debate over how
much power Congress has given the SEC to regulate insider trading, it
is remarkable that a statute directly addressed to that issue has been
ignored for all practical purposes. Part of the explanation no doubt
lies in the fact that the relevant portions of the 1988 Act are hard to
find.14 Yet given the high stakes involved in insider trading litigation,
the statute should have at least been considered. The fuller
explanation is probably that courts and lawyers are used to treating
insider trading law as common law,15 even though courts regularly
rebuff SEC initiatives by incanting that if law is to be made, Congress
has to do it.16 Perhaps, for securities regulation at least, what is
needed is a better law of statutes for an age of common law.17
This Article begins by outlining the extra-legislative develop-
ment of insider trading law over the last two decades. After noting
the restrictions on the SEC's regulatory power established by the
Supreme Court in the early 1980s, Part II turns to the SEC's initially
14. The findings are not included as a numbered section of the United States Code,
(although they are appended to 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1 (1994)), nor are they included in the various
single-volume collections of federal securities statutes and rules. Title 15 of the United States
Code has not been enacted into law, but is merely a compilation of statutes, including the 1988
Act.
15. See United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 572 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc) (Winter, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The legal rules governing insider trading under
Section 10(b) are based solely on administrative and judicial case law.").
16. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 656-58 (1983) (rejecting the SEC's theory of tippee
liability as inconsistent with the Court's view of congressional intent in Chiarella v. United
States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980)). See also O'Hagan, 1997 U.S. LEXIS 4033 at *82 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) ("[Tihe repeated reliance on such broad-sweeping legislative purposes reaches too far
and is misleading in the context of the misappropriation theory. It reaches too far in that,
regardless of the overarching purpose of the securities laws, it is not illegal to run afoul of the
'purpose' of a statute, only its letter."); Central Bank, NA. v. First Interstate Bank, N.A., 511 U.S.
164, 173 (1994) (stating that the statutory text controls the definition of conduct forbidden under
§ 10(b)); Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 234 ("Mhe 1934 Act cannot be read more broadly than its
language and the statutory scheme reasonably permit.") (quoting Touche Ross & Co. v.
Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578 (1979), which was quoting SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 116 (1978))
(internal quotation marks omitted); Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472-73
(1977) (holding that the rulemaking power granted to the SEC is not the power to make law and
therefore cannot exceed the power granted to it by Congress in § 10(b)) (citing and quoting Ernst
& Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214 (1975)).
17. Guido Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes (Harvard, 1988). Compare
Steve Thel, Section 12(2) of the Securities Act: Does Old Legislation Matter?, 63 Fordham L. Rev.
1183, 1183-84 (1995) (suggesting that the Supreme Court should ignore statutory language in
Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 115 S. Ct. 1061 (1995)), with Therese Maynard, A Requiem: Reflections
on Gustafson, 57 Ohio St. L. J. 1327 (1996) (criticizing the Court's disregard for the plain lan-
guage and structure of the statute in Gustafson); Elliott J. Weiss, Securities Act Section 12(2)
After Gustafson v. Alloyd Co.: What Questions Remain?, 50 Bus. Law 1209 (1995) (same);
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Securities Act Section 12(2) After the Gustafson Debacle, 50 Bus. Law
1231, 1246-50 (1995) (same); Edmund W. Kitch, Gustafson v. Alloyd Co.: An Opinion That Did
Not Write, 1995 S. Ct. Rev. 99, 108-15, 121 (1995) (same).
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successful attempt to circumvent those restrictions with the misap-
propriation doctrine under rule 10b-5 and the parity-of-information
regime it established for tender offers with rule 14e-3. The misappro-
priation doctrine and rule 14e-3 have both been controversial, and this
outline is not intended to show they were either wise or within the
Commission's authority. On the contrary, the point of this Article is
that the findings were enacted precisely because the Commission's
authority to enforce the misappropriation doctrine and rule 14e-3 had
come into question by the time the 1988 Act was enacted. Part II
concludes with a brief discussion of the judiciary's reaction to the
misappropriation doctrine and rule 14e-3 since 1988, including recent
decisions holding them to be beyond the SEC's authority. The purpose
of this discussion is not to quarrel with these decisions or to establish
the validity of the misappropriation doctrine and rule 14e-3-the
Supreme Court's opinion in O'Hagan has established their validity, at
least in broad outline. Instead, these decisions are discussed simply to
show that the primary attack on the SEC's insider trading initiatives
went to the scope of the Commission's power to regulate trading, and
to highlight the issue that Congress faced when it addressed the valid-
ity of the Commission's initiatives in 1988.
Part III of this Article discusses the 1988 Act, particularly its
declaration that rules 10b-5 and 14e-3 are valid to the extent that they
forbid trading on the basis of material nonpublic information. Part IV
examines implications of the 1988 Act's findings. These findings
present complicated problems, and the question of whether the courts
are bound to respect them turns largely on the way courts and
Congress ought to interact. However, past judicial practice with
respect to analogous statutes indicates that courts should respect the
will of Congress expressed in the findings. In 1988, statutory findings
were the best mechanism available for Congress to establish the
enforceability of rule 14e-3 and the misappropriation doctrine. By
ignoring those findings, the same courts that insisted that Congress
ought to make securities law relegated Congress to a relatively
insignificant lawmaking role in which it could not even make itself
heard.
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II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MISAPPROPRIATION DOCTRINE AND
RULE 14E-3
A. Insider Trading and Deception
The language of the Exchange Act has been the starting point
for discussion of the legality of insider trading since 1980, when the
Supreme Court focused on the issue of the SEC's regulatory authority
in Chiarella v. United States.18 The securities statutes themselves do
not forbid anyone to trade securities on the basis of material nonpublic
information. 19 The prohibition is contained in SEC rules, specifically
rule 10b-5 and, if the information relates to a tender offer, rule 14e-3.
These rules are written in broad terms that have generally been taken
to encompass all trading by those who possess material nonpublic
information about securities. 20 Rule 10b-5 does not address insider
trading explicitly, 21 but it has always been taken as a sweeping rule
18. 445 U.S. 222, 225-35 (1980). See also O'Hagan, 1997 U.S. LEXIS 4033 at *18
("Liability under Rule 10b-5, our precedent indicates, does not extend beyond conduct encom-
passed by § 10(b)'s prohibition."); Dirks, 463 U.S. at 656-58 (discussing the SEC's theory of tippee
liability in relation to the Court's interpretation of Rule 10b-5 in Chiarella).
19. The Exchange Act does make it illegal to trade options while in possession of material
nonpublic information if trading the underlying security would be illegal, but it does not say
when trading the underlying security is illegal. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(d) (prohibiting the sale or
purchase of options with respect to a security as to which the trader has material nonpublic
information). Thus, even this limited statutory proscription of insider trading in derivatives is
derivative of the sub-statutory law of insider trading. The Exchange Act also creates sanctions
for insider trading that are tied to the violation of a rule. Id. §§ 78t(d), 78t-1, 78u-1 (all prohibit-
ing the violation of rules promulgated under the statute).
20. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 657 (1983) ("In effect, the SEC's theory of tippee liability in both
cases appears rooted in the idea that the antifraud provisions require equal information among
all traders."); Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 232. The Chiarella Court concluded that the court of
appeals'
decision thus rested solely upon its belief that the federal securities laws have created a
system providing equal access to information necessary for reasoned and intelligent in-
vestment decisions .... The use by anyone of material information not generally avail-
able is fraudulent, this theory suggests, because such information gives certain buyers or
sellers an unfair advantage over less informed buyers and sellers.
Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). See also Bryan, 58 F.3d at 945 (discussing
the broadest scope of rule lob-5). But see O'Hagan, 1997 U.S. LEXIS 4033 at *66 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting in part) (arguing that the Court's construction of section 10(b) is not in accord with the
principle of lenity applied to criminal statutes, "which cannot be mitigated here by the Rule,
which is no less ambiguous than the statute"). The courts holding that the SEC exceeded its
authority to regulate insider trading have not suggested that the trading at issue did not violate
SEC rules. See O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 615-27; Bryan, 58 F.3d 943-59.
21. See Donald C. Langevoort, Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Principle: A
Post-Chiarella Restatement, 70 Cal. L. Rev. 1, 2-3 (1982) (stating that the development of insider
trading law "has occurred even though neither the rule nor the statutory provision expressly
prohibits insider trading. Rather, the law is almost entirely the product of judicial and adminis-
trative construction.").
1098 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [50:1091
that prescribes all manner of objectionable trading practices. 22 Rule
14e-3 by its terms explicitly forbids trading by most people who
possess nonpublic information about tender offers. While the SEC has
aggressively tried to regulate insider trading, the difficult question
since Chiarella has been whether it has the power to do so. Courts
have looked to the language of sections 10(b) and 14(e) of the
Exchange Act for the answer to that question.2 3
The defendant in Chiarella was convicted of violating rule 10b-
5 and section 10(b) of the Exchange Act because he bought the
common stock of several companies after discovering, in the course of
his employment as a financial printer, that his employer's customers
planned to acquire that stock at premium prices. The Supreme Court
reversed the conviction, holding that the government had to do more
than simply demonstrate that the defendant bought securities while
in possession of material nonpublic information. 24 While its holding
was narrow, the Court's explanation set the framework for all subse-
quent developments in the law of insider trading.
As it usually does in cases charging violations of rule 10b-5, the
Court focused on the language of section 10(b) in Chiarella, explaining
that the Exchange Act "cannot be-read more broadly than its language
and the statutory scheme permit."21 Section 10(b) makes it unlawful
22. Joseph A. Grundfest, Disimplying Private Rights of Action under the Federal Securities
Laws: The Commission's Authority, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 963, 977 (1994) ("The expansive language
of Rule 10b-5, and the Commission's sweeping interpretations, have caused the rule to become
'as broad as almost any statute, a sort of long-arm provision in which the SEC forbids everything
the statute gives it power to forbid.'") (quoting Thel, 42 Stan. L. Rev. at 463 (cited in note 12)).
See Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 212 (observing that the language of rule 10b-5 can be read to
proscribe any material omission and any conduct that has the effect of defrauding investors);
Edward W. Kitch, A Federal Vision of Securities Law, 70 Va. L. Rev. 857, 861 (1984) (stating that
"the SEC promulgated a regulation that spoke with the same generality as the statute" it was
designed to implement); Donald C. Langevoort, Rule 10b-5 as an Adaptive Organism, 61
Fordham L. Rev. S7, S-11 to S-15 (1993) (outlining rule 10b-5's ability to mold the historical
changes in the social perceptions of investing).
23. Recognizing the importance of statutory language, the courts which recently found that
the SEC acted outside its regulatory authority devoted most of their opinions to manipulating
the language of sections 10(b) and 14(e). See O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 613 ("[N]either the statutory
language of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), nor Supreme
Court precedent interpreting it, will support the use of the 'misappropriation theory.' "); id. at
615-16 (dissecting the language of the statute); Bryan, 58 F.3d at 945 ("For at least two decades,
however, the Supreme Court has repeatedly warned against expanding the concept of fraud in
the securities context beyond what the words of the [Exchange] Act reasonably will bear."); id. at
944-50 (discussing the meaning of the language of § 10(b)).
24. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235-37.
25. Id. at 234 (quoting Touche Ross & Co., 442 U.S. at 578, quoting Sloan, 436 U.S. at 116)
(internal quotation marks omitted). See also id. at 233 ("Formulation of such a broad
duty... should not be undertaken absent some explicit evidence of congressional intent.").
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to use any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
connection with the purchase or sale of a security in contravention of
such rules as the SEC may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in
the public interest or for the protection of investors. The complication
in Chiarella, as in most insider trading cases, was that the defendant
had not said anything to anyone, let alone lied.26  Given Chiarella's
silence, the problem was finding a deceptive device.27 The Court held
that silence is not deceptive (the Court used the word "fraudulent")
within the meaning of section 10(b) unless the silent party has a duty
to speak, and that mere possession of nonpublic information does not
give rise to such a duty.2 This holding dictated reversal, since the
trial court had not required the government to prove that the defen-
The Supreme Court summarized its history with rule 10b-5 recently, and in so doing
accurately emphasized the critical importance it has ascribed to the language of section 10(b) in
its rule 10b-5 cases:
In our cases addressing § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, we have confronted two main is-
sues. First, we have determined the scope of conduct prohibited by § 10(b). See, e. g.,
Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983); Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980); Chiarella v.
United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980); Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462
(1977); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). Second, in cases where the
defendant has committed a violation of § 10(b), we have decided questions about the
elements of the 10b-5 private liability scheme: for example, whether there is a right to
contribution, what the statute of limitations is, whether there is a reliance requirement,
and whether there is an inpari delicto defense....
With respect, however, to the first issue, the scope of conduct prohibited by § 10(b),
the text of the statute controls our decision... our cases considering the scope of conduct
prohibited by § 10(b) in private suits have emphasized adherence to the statutory lan-
guage, "'[tihe starting point in every case involving construction of a statute.'" Ernst &
Ernst, 425 U.S. at 197 (quoting Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 756 (Powell, J., concur-
ring)). See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 226; Santa Fe Industries, 435 U.S. at 472. We have re-
fused to allow lOb-5 challenges to conduct not prohibited by the text of the statute.
Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 172-73. See also id. at 175 ("Our consideration of statutory duties,
especially in cases interpreting § 10(b), establishes that the statutory text controls the definition
of conduct covered by § 10(b)."); id. at 177 ("It is inconsistent with settled methodology in § 10(b)
cases to extend liability beyond the scope of conduct prohibited by the statutory text."); Aaron v.
SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 689-90 (1980) (emphasizing the primacy of "the plain meaning of the
language of § 10(b)"); Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 213-14 ("The rulemaking power granted to an
administrative agency charged with the administration of a federal statute is not the power to
make law. Rather, it is the power to adopt regulations to carry into effect the will of Congress as
expressed by the statute.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
26. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 226 n.5. See Aaron, 446 U.S. at 689-95 (SEC must prove scienter
as an element of its civil enforcement action); Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 212-15 (plaintiff must
prove scienter in private action for violation of rule 10b-5).
27. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 226 ("§ 10(b) does not state whether silence may constitute a
manipulative or deceptive device."). The Supreme Court has largely read "manipulative" out of
section 10(b), at least in the context of insider trading regulation. Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 198
(stating that the word manipulative is "virtually a term of art when used in connection with
securities markets"). See Aaron, 446 U.S. at 690 (equating "manipulative" with "device" or
"contrivance"); O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 615 n.4 (focusing on the "deception," not the "manipulative,"
component of § 10(b)); Bryan, 58 F.3d at 945-46 (same).
28. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 234-35.
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dant was under any duty to disclose information before trading.
Instead, the trial court had permitted the jury to convict upon a mere
finding that the defendant had traded while in possession of material
nonpublic information.29
Although the Court held that section 10(b) does not forbid all
trading by those in possession of material nonpublic information, it
did not say that such trading is always legal. On the contrary, the
Court indicated that corporate insiders have a duty to disclose mate-
rial nonpublic corporate information before buying corporate stock,
because of "the relationship of trust and confidence between the
shareholders of a corporation and those insiders who have obtained
confidential information by reason of their position with that corpora-
tion."30 Since silence in the face of a duty of disclosure is deceptive
within the meaning of section 10(b), corporate insiders who buy com-
mon stock from public stockholders without disclosing material non-
public corporate information are guilty of deception and thus violate
rule 10b-5 and section 10(b).31
This theory of insider trading liability captures senior corpo-
rate employees who buy their employer's common stock after obtain-
ing material nonpublic information during the course of their em-
ployment. However, those who do not work for the issuer of trade
securities fall outside of the scope of the restriction inasmuch as such
people have no obvious "relationship of trust and confidence" with the
issuer's shareholders.32  The disclosure duty recognized in
Chiarella-the fiduciary duty of candor that corporate insiders owe to
owners of corporate equity securities-may not be implicated when
someone trades on the basis of material nonpublic information that is
not obtained directly or indirectly from the issuer of the traded
securities, even if that information is obtained improperly. If this
duty of candor is not implicated, then such "outsider" trading is illegal
only if it is deceptive (or fraudulent) in some other sense.
B. The Misappropriation Doctrine and Rule 14e-3
Chiarella appeared to be a substantial setback for those who
objected to people trading while in possession of material nonpublic in-
formation. Very quickly, however, the SEC developed two related
29. Id. at 235.
30. Id. at 228.
31. Id. at 230.
32. See Langevoort, 70 Cal. L. Rev. at 44-52 (cited in note 21) (discussing misappropriation
theories).
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tools to recover the initiative: the misappropriation doctrine under
rule 10b-5 and rule 14e-3. The misappropriation doctrine builds on
the Supreme Court's approach to insider trading by tying insider
trading regulation to the trader's participation in the breach of an
independent fiduciary duty, the duty not to steal; whereas, in
Chiarella, the Court focused on the fiduciary's duty to disclose. Rule
14e-3, in contrast, amounts to adoption of a principle of equal access to
information about tender offers, which is justified (if justified at all) by
being grounded in section 14(e) of the Exchange Act instead of the
arguably narrower grant of rule-making authority in section 10(b).
Even before the Supreme Court decided Chiarella, the SEC had
proposed rule 14e-3, which would have established for tender offers
something close to the parity-of-information regime that the Court
rejected. In 1980, a few months after the Court decided Chiarella, the
SEC went ahead and adopted its rule. Rule 14e-3 provides that once
someone has taken a substantial step to commence a tender offer for a
security, no one else in possession of material nonpublic information
relating to such offer may trade that security (or any security derived
from it) if she has reason to know the information came from the of-
feror or the issuer of the security or from affiliates or agents of
either.33
Although the Commission adopted rule 14e-3 in the shadow of
Chiarella, it did not attempt to justify the rule as a regulation of de-
ception, at least not deception in the narrow sense in which Chiarella
defined it. The Commission grounded rule 14e-3 in sections 14(e) and
23(a) of the Exchange Act,34 rather than on section 10(b). The
Exchange Act can be read to give the Commission greater rulemaking
power under section 14(e) than under section 10(b)3 5 The Commission
certainly claimed as much, insisting that Chiarella did not "suggest
any limitation on the commission's authority under Section 14(e) to
adopt a rule regulating trading while in possession of material,
nonpublic information relating to a tender offer."36
Rule 14e-3 was held to be within the SEC's authority shortly
after it was adopted,37 and, for a while, every court that considered the
33. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1996). See Exchange Act Release No. 17,120, [1980 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Secur. L. Rptr. (CCH) 82,646 (Sept. 4, 1980) (announcing adoption of rule 14e-3)
("Release No. 17,120").
34. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1994) (codifying Exchange Act § 14(e)); id. § 78w(a) (codifying
Exchange Act § 23(a)). See Release No. 17,120 at 83,453 (cited in note 33).
35. The Supreme Court seemed to recognize this possibility in Chiarella. See Chiarella,
445 U.S. at 234 (discussing SEC's proposal of rule 14e-3).
36. Release No. 17,120 at 83,456 (cited in note 33).
37. O'Connor & Assoc. v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 529 F. Supp. 1179, 1188-93 (S.D.N.Y.
1981).
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question agreed that the SEC had acted within its power in adopting
the rule.38 The Supreme Court has now held that, at least insofar as it
serves to prevent trading on the basis of misappropriated information
after a tender offer has commenced, "Rule 14e-3 is a proper exercise of
the Commision's prophylactic power under § 14(e)."39 Nonetheless, the
validity of rule 14e-3 was clearly questionable when the SEC adopted
it and when Congress acted in 1988.
Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act makes it unlawful for any
person to engage in any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or
practices in connection with any tender offer, and further provides
that the SEC "shall... by rules and regulations define, and prescribe
means reasonably designed to prevent, such acts and practices as are
fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative."40 If Chiarella did not limit
the SEC's power under section 14(e), it is either because the word
"deceptive" has a broader meaning in section 14(e) than in section
10(b), or because the SEC has greater rulemaking power under section
14(e) than it has under section 10(b).. However, in a 1985 decision
narrowly construing section 14(e), Burlington Northern, Inc. v.
Schreiber,41 the Supreme Court emphasized the similarities between
section 14(e) and section 10(b), 42 and its opinion can be read to suggest
that section 14(e)'s language should be construed as narrowly as
section 10(b)'s. If it were, rule 14e-3 would seem an invalid adminis-
trative attempt to make law. In the end, ample proof that the rule's
foundation was at least suspect is provided not only by Schreiber and
the criticism of academic commentators, 43 but also by the Eighth
Circuit's decision that it was invalid in O'Hagan44 and Justice
Thomas's dissent from that decision's reversal.
38. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 556-63; SEC v. Maio, 51 F.3d 623, 635 (7th Cir. 1995); SEC v.
Ferrero, [1993-1994 Transfer Binder] Fed. Secur. L. Rptr. (CCH) 98,120, 98,941 (C.D. Cal.
Dec. 2, 1993); United States v. Victor Teicher & Co., 785 F. Supp. 1137, 1150-51 (S.D.N.Y. 1992);
United States v. Marcus, Schloss & Co., 710 F. Supp. 944, 955-57 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); SEC v.
Musella, 578 F. Supp. 425, 443-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
39. O'Hagan, 1997 U.S. LEXIS 4033 at *60. The Court did not address Mr. O'Hagan's
argument that rule 14e-3 is invalid because it prohibits trading in advance of tender offers. See
id. at *61.
40. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e).
41. 472 U.S. 1 (1985).
42 Id. at 6-10.
43. See John F. Olson, John H. Sturc, and Gerald T. Lihs, Recent Insider Trading
Developments: The Search for Clarity, 85 Nw. U. L. Rev. 715, 735-37 (1991) (discussing recent
case law which rejects the Commission's use of Rule 14e-3); Brent G. Stahl, Note, Rule 14e-3:
Invalid in the Criminal Context, 16 Am. J. Crim. L. 367, 367-80 (1979) (arguing that the disclose
or abstain provisions of Rule 14e-3 should be held invalid under the Rule of Lenity).
44. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 627. See Part II.C (discussing the Eighth Circuit's decision in
O'Hagan).
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The other attempt to avoid the restrictions of Chiarella was the
misappropriation doctrine. Until the Supreme Court decided
O'Hagan, the only form of trading on material nonpublic information
that the Court had said the SEC could regulate under section 10(b)
was trading by corporate insiders and, in some cases, their tippees. 45
Nonetheless, as the SEC noted when it adopted rule 14e-3, 46 the Court
never expressly foreclosed the possibility that section 10(b) and rule
10b-5 may forbid others to trade on the basis of material nonpublic
information. In particular, the Court in Chiarella did not address the
government's theory that section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 require persons
who possess misappropriated nonpublic information to disclose that
information or abstain from trading.47 Since the trial judge did not
submit this theory to the jury, the Court declined to "speculate" on
whether it would support a conviction for violation of section 10(b). 48
Shortly after Chiarella was decided and about the same time
the SEC adopted rule 14e-3, the Second Circuit concluded that section
10(b) and rule 10b-5 make it unlawful for a person to trade in securi-
ties in breach of fiduciary duty by secretly converting for personal use
information that has been entrusted to him.49  Thereafter, several
other courts followed and held that rule 10b-5 makes it unlawful to
trade on the basis of misappropriated material nonpublic information
in violation of a duty owed to the source of the information, and that
the SEC has authority to forbid such trading even if the trader owes
no duty of disclosure to the other party to the trade.5°
45. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 653-60.
46. See Release No. 17,120 at 83,456 (cited in note 33) ("[Ihe Chiarella Court did not
resolve whether trading while in possession of material, nonpublic market information misap-
propriated or obtained or used by unlawful means violates Rule 10b-5. The Commission contin-
ues to believe that such conduct undermines the integrity of, and investor confidence in, the
securities markets, and that persons who unlawfully obtain or misappropriate material, nonpub-
lic information violate rule 10b-5 when they trade on such information.").
47. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235-36.
48. Id. at 236-37. The concurring and dissenting opinions seemed quite sympathetic to the
misappropriation doctrine. See id. at 238 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("[A] legitimate argument
could be made that [Chiarella's] actions constituted a fraud or a deceit."); id. at 239 (Brennan, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (stating that "a person violates § 10(b) whenever he improperly
obtains or converts to his own benefit nonpublic information"); id. at 240-45 (Burger, J., dissent-
ing) (advocating a broad application of the misappropriation theory); id. at 245 (Blackmun and
Marshall, JJ., dissenting) (agreeing with Justice Burger's view that § 10(b) encompasses the
misappropriation theory).
49. United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 16 (2d Cir. 1981).
50. See, for example, United States v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1991); SEC v. Clark,
915 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Libera, 989 F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1993); SEC v. Lenfest,
1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18961 (E.D. Pa.); SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984); SEC v.
Willis, 787 F. Supp. 58 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); SEC v. Singer, 786 F. Supp. 1158 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). But
see Chestman, 947 F.2d at 551, 570-71 (endorsing doctrine but finding no duty in family relation-
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The success of the misappropriation doctrine paralleled that of
rule 14e-3. For a long time, every court faced with the question con-
cluded that trading on the basis of misappropriated material nonpub-
lic information violates section 10(b) and rule 10b-5, and further that
the SEC had authority to regulate such trading. However, this
judicial acceptance does not mean courts were correct in these
holdings, or even that the parameters of the doctrine were clear.51 On
the contrary, the validity of the misappropriation doctrine was
arguably even more tenuous than that of rule 14e-3. 52 As with the
rule, some commentators have criticized the doctrine, 53 and, like the
rule, some courts essentially held it to be an invalid SEC attempt to
make law.54
.The Supreme Court's 1987 opinion in United States v.
Carpenter55 made the weakness of the misappropriation doctrine's
foundation vividly clear. Carpenter involved a Wall Street Journal
columnist and several stock brokers who profitably traded securities
in advance of their mention in the Journals "Heard on the Street"
column, apparently in contravention of Journal policy. The Second
Circuit affirmed criminal convictions for violations of section 10(b),
rule 10b-5, and the mail and wire fraud statutes, and in doing so
firmly endorsed a broad scope for the misappropriation doctrine.56 The
Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the convictions on the mail and
ship); Rothberg v. Rosenbloom, 771 F.2d 818, 822 (3d Cir. 1985) (arguably endorsing misappro-
priation doctrine).
51. See Chestman, 947 F.2d at 564-71, 573-81 (en banc court splitting over whether
information was misappropriated within meaning of the doctrine); Wang and Steinberg, Insider
Trading at 381-389 (cited in note 1) (discussing open questions for misappropriation doctrine);
Bainbridge, 52 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. at 1243-45 (cited in note 12) (same); Jonn R. Beeson,
Comment, Rounding the Peg to Fit the Hole: A Proposed Regulatory Reform of the
Misappropriation Theory, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1077, 1125-40 (1996) (same).
52. See notes 38 and 41 and accompanying text (comparing the authority given to the SEC
under §§ 14(e) and 10(b)).
53. See Barbara Bader Aldave, The Misappropriation Theory: Carpenter and Its
Aftermath, 49 Ohio St. L. J. 373, 378-80 (1988) (suggesting a broader conception of the misappro-
priation theory than was present at the time of Carpenter); Michael P. Kenny and Teresa D.
Thebaut, Misguided Statutory Construction to Cover the Corporate Universe The
Misappropriation Theory of Section 10(b), 59 Albany L. Rev. 139, 180-210 (1995) (criticizing the
use of the misappropriation theory in case law for creating doctrinal incoherence); David Cowan
Bayne, The Insider's Natural Law Duty: Chestman and the 'Misappropriation Theory", 43 U.
Kan. L. Rev. 79, 79-161 (1994) (criticizing the development of the misappropriation theory);
Beeson, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 1138 (cited in note 51). But see Langevoort, 70 Cal. L. Rev. at 46
(cited in note 21) ("The novelty of this rationale should not be underestimated"); Jill E. Fisch,
Start Making Sense: An Analysis and Proposal for Insider Trading Regulation, 26 Ga. L. Rev.
179, 202-08 (1991) (criticizing misappropriation doctrine in 1991).
54. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 622; Bryan, 58 F.3d at 952-53. See also Part II.C (discussing
O'Hagan and Bryan).
55. 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
56. 791 F.2d 1024, 1031-35 (2d Cir. 1986), affd, 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
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wire fraud counts and discussed them extensively. 57 However, the
Court was evenly divided on the question of whether trading on the
basis of misappropriated information violates section 10(b) and rule
10b-5.58 The Court explained simply: "The Court is evenly divided
with respect to the convictions under the securities laws and for that
reason affirms the judgment below on those counts."59
In sum, by 1988-an important year in this story-the narrow
insider-trading rule that survived Chiarella had been supplemented
by the SEC's rule 14e-3 and the misappropriation doctrine under rule
10b-5. The basic structure of the misappropriation doctrine was set-
tled, at least in broad outline, and courts had shown themselves will-
ing to decide difficult questions of its scope without further guidance
from Congress. The scope of rule 14e-3 was quite clear, because the
rule itself spoke in direct terms. Yet even if the scope of the prohibi-
tions were largely clear in 1988, their effects were not-both rule 14e-
3 and the misappropriation doctrine rested on uncertain statutory
ground.
Each was based on a construction of statutory language that
stretched the limits of Chiarella, and although no court had rejected
the rule or the doctrine, critics had questioned the validity of both
while most courts had not had occasion to consider either. More
importantly, Carpenter suggested that the Supreme Court was
uncomfortable with the misappropriation doctrine; and if that doctrine
was invalid, then, in light of Schreiber, rule 14e-3 might be invalid too.
C. The Attack on the Misappropriation Doctrine and Rule 14e-3
Rule 14e-3 and the misappropriation doctrine both suffered
under judicial scrutiny after Carpenter. In 1991, the Second Circuit,
which had been the court most sympathetic to the misappropriation
doctrine, signaled that the doctrine could not be extended to guarantee
equal access to material information. In its en banc decision in United
States v. Chestman,w the court held that a member of a family that
controlled a public company did not breach any duty of confidentiality
when he leaked information about an impending tender offer to a
stockbroker. Accordingly, the court held that the broker did not
violate rule 10b-5 when he traded on the basis of the tipped informa-
57. 484 U.S. at 25-28.
58. Id. at 24. See Carlos J. Cuevas, The Misappropriation Theory and Rule 10b-5:
Deadlock in the Supreme Court, 13 J. Corp. L. 793, 809-15 (1988).
59. Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 24.
60. 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 1004 (1992).
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tion, even under the misappropriation doctrine.61 The court, however,
did affirm the broker's conviction for violating rule 14e-3,62 albeit over
a dissent arguing that the Commission had exceeded its authority.63
After Chestman, the misappropriation doctrine and rule 14e-3
were attacked more successfully. In 1995, in United States v. Bryan,6
the Fourth Circuit rejected the misappropriation doctrine, reasoning
that even if the breach of trust that underlies a finding of
misappropriation is deceptive,65 section 10(b) "reaches only deception
of persons with some connection to, or some interest or stake in, an
actual or proposed purchase or sale of securities."6 The court refused
to find that a person who misappropriates information from one per-
son and then trades with another person violates section 10(b). 67
According to the court, "neither the language of section 10(b), Rule
10b-5, the Supreme Court authority interpreting these provisions, nor
the purposes of these securities fraud prohibitions, will support convic-
tions resting on the particular theory of misappropriation adopted by
our sister circuits."68
Last year, in United States v. O'Hagan,69 the Eighth Circuit
followed Bryan and held "that § 10(b) liability cannot be based on the
misappropriation doctrine."70 The court went further, however, and
also held that "the SEC exceeded its rulemaking authority by enacting
61. Id. at 570-71. But see United States v. Reed, 601 F. Supp. 685, 720 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
(holding a jury could find that son violated rule 10b-5 by trading on material nonpublic
information obtained from father), rev'd on other grounds, 773 F.2d 477 (2d Cir. 1985). The
Second Circuit declined to overturn Reed in Chestman, 947 F.2d at 569. Judge Winter dissented
from Chestmai's restriction on the scope of the misappropriation theory, but not on the ground
that the broker violated the rules established by Chiarella and Dirks-or even any coherent
theory of what is illegal-but instead on the theory that "the law is far enough down this
road.., that a court of appeals has no option but to continue the route" Id. at 578.
62. Id. at 555-63.
63. Id. at 583-88 (Mahoney, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
64. 58 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1995). For a discussion of Bryan, see generally Langevoort,
Insider Trading § 6.02, at 6-9 to 6-11 (cited in note 1); Kenny and Thebaut, 59 Albany L. Rev. at
144-45, 206-11 (cited in note 53); Beeson, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 1135-36 (cited in note 51);
Timothy J. Horman, Comment, In Defense of United States v. Bryan: Why the Misappropriation
Theory is Indefensible, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 2455 (1996); Recent Cases, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 524,
536-41 (1995).
65. See Bryan, 58 F.3d at 949 ("Even if the misappropriation theory required deception, or
deception were otherwise present, the theory still does not require deception violative of fair
representation or disclosure owed to a market participant....").
66. Id. at 950.
67. Id. But see Part II.B (questioning this holding).
68. Bryan, 58 F.3d at 944.
69. 92 F.3d 612.
70. Id. at 617. See id. at 613 ("INjeither the statutory language of section 10(b) nor the
Supreme Court precedent interpreting it will support the use of the misappropriation theory");
id. at 620 ("We find the analysis from Bryan persuasive and have borrowed heavily from it in
arriving at our conclusion. Therefore, we adopt that court's analysis in its entirety as our own.").
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Rule 14e-3(a) without including the requirement of a breach of a fidu-
ciary duty."71 The court rejected rule 14e-3 for essentially the same
reason it rejected the misappropriation doctrine under section 10(b)
and rule 10b-5. As the court saw it, "although perhaps § 14(e) is the
product of clearer legislative draftsmanship [than is section 10(b)], the
authority granted to the SEC under both provisions is fundamentally
the same."7 2 It followed that since the Commission could not forbid
trading on the basis of misappropriated information under section
10(b), it could not forbid even more under section 14(e).
The Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit's decision in
O'Hagan, and in doing so it rejected the analysis of Bryan as well.73
The Court held that the language of section 10(b) encompasses trading
on the basis of misappropriated information, and that the SEC had
the power under section 14(e) to adopt rule 14e-3. The Court's
interpretation of sections 10(b) and 14(e) is reasonable, but it is not
the only reasonable interpretation of the statute. Two circuit courts of
appeal and dissenting justices in O'Hagan read the statute otherwise.
Indeed, whoever was right about what sections 10(b) and 14(e) mean,
the reason the Court had to decide O'Hagan was that its own earlier
insider trading cases had raised doubts about the SEC's authority to
regulate trading like that of Mr. O'Hagan. The 1988 Act, however,
directly addresses that authority, and it did so precisely to resolve the
doubts that the Court had created.
III. THE 1988 ACT AND THE SEC's POWER TO REGULATE INSIDER
TRADING
The sketch of the rules governing insider trading set out above
focused on the law as it has developed in the courts. This focus on
judicial developments echoes the conventional wisdom that the courts
have decided what kinds of trading are unlawful, under prodding from
the SEC, with Congress stepping in only to increase the penalties from
time to time.7 4 Thus the Eighth Circuit in O'Hagan insisted that
Congress has done nothing since enacting section 10(b) and 14(e) that
is relevant to the validity of the misappropriation doctrine and rule
71. Id. at 624. See id. at 614, 627 (finding that the SEC had exceeded its authority in
promulgating Rule 14e-3(a) without requiring a breach of fiduciary duty obligation).
72. Id. at 626.
73. 1997 U.S. LEXIS 4033.
74. See notes 15-23 and accompanying text (discussing the evolution of the Court's treat-
ment of insider trading).
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14e-3. 75 Nevertheless, several recent federal statutes deal with insider
trading,76 and the 1988 Act explicitly addressed the validity of the
SEC's rules against insider trading.
A. The 1988 Act and the Law of Insider Trading
The better-known provisions of the 1988 Act increased sanc-
tions against illegal insider trading. They amended the Exchange Act
to increase the criminal penalties for violations of the Exchange Act;7"
to authorize the SEC to seek civil penalties against those who violate
the Exchange Act or its regulations by trading securities while in
possession of material nonpublic information;78 to require brokers and
dealers to establish policies and procedures designed to prevent the il-
legal misuse of material nonpublic information;79 and to establish an
explicit private right of action for cofitemporaneous traders against
those who violate the Exchange Act by trading securities while in
possession of material nonpublic information. 80
Congress did not define insider trading in the 1988 Act, despite
substantial pressure to do so.81 Instead, the 1988 Act's sanctions
attach to insider trading that is forbidden by other parts of the securi-
ties laws. They are available when someone violates any provision of
the Exchange Act or its rules "by purchasing or selling a security
while in possession of material, nonpublic information.82 The House
Energy and Commerce Committee offered two justifications for its
75. 92 F.3d at 626 n.17. But see Bainbridge, 52 Wash & Lee L. Rev. at 1204-05 (cited in
note 12) (criticizing Bryan for failing to consider reenactment doctrine).
76. See generally 1988 Act; Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98
Stat. 1264 (1984), codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1994).
77. 1988 Act § 4 (amending Exchange Act § 32(a)), codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (1994).
78. 1988 Act § 3(a) (adding Exchange Act § 21A), codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1 (1994).
79. 1988 Act § 3(b) (adding Exchange Act § 15(f)), codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o(f) (1994).
80. 1988 Act § 5 (adding Exchange Act § 20A), codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1 (1994). Some
courts had already recognized an implied private right of action for contemporaneous traders
under rule 10b-5, but the Second Circuit had held that a private right of action was not available
to contemporaneous traders when the trader had traded on the basis of misappropriated nonpub-
lic information. Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 15-16 (2nd Cir. 1983). See William K.
S. Wang, A Cause of Action for Option Traders Against Inside Option Traders, 101 Harv. L. Rev.
1056, 1059 n.13 (1988) (discussing Moss). The 1988 Act's explicit right of action was designed to
reverse Moss. See Part III.B (explaining how the 1988 findings validated the misappropriation
doctrine).
81. See House Comm'n on Energy and Commerce, Insider Trading and S.E.C. Fraud
Enforcement Act of 1988, H.R. Rep. No. 100-910 at 10-11 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6043, 6059 ("House Report") (citing the definition as a "continuing concern" and "the focus of
much attention"). By 1988, a remarkable number of commentators had written that Congress
ought to codify the prohibition of insider trading in a statute. See Loss and Seligman, 8
Securities Regulation at 3762 n.760 (cited in note 1) (collecting citations).
82. 1988 Act § 21A (a) (1).
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decision not to set out a precise prohibition in the statute. First, it
was satisfied that court decisions had established relatively clear legal
guidelines already. The Committee felt that a statutory definition
inadvertently might have narrowed the law and provided a sort of
roadmap to fraud that would have enabled traders to evade the law.
Second, it felt that the enactment of the sanctions provided in the
statute should not be delayed by debate over a definition of insider
trading.8 3
Although the sponsors of the 1988 Act did not want to enact a
complete statutory statement of when insider trading is illegal, they
apparently did want to indicate that the trading that the courts had
held to be illegal should remain illegal.8 Toward that end, section 2 of
the statute provides that
The Congress finds that-
(1) the rules and regulations of the Securities and Exchange Commission
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 governing trading while in posses-
sion of material, non-public information are, as required by such Act, necessary
and appropriate in the public interest and for the protection of investors;
(2) the Commission has, within the limits of accepted administrative and
judicial construction of such rules and regulations, enforced such rules and
regulations vigorously, effectively, and fairly; and
(3) nonetheless, additional methods are appropriate to deter and prose-
cute violations of such rules and regulations.8 5
As discussed below, the rules to which these findings refer are
rule 10b-5 and rule 14e-3. If these rules are, as the findings state,
necessary and appropriate in the public interest and for the protection
of investors, then rule 14e-3 is a valid and enforceable rule, and trad-
ing on the basis of misappropriated nonpublic information is a viola-
tion of rule 10b-5 and section 10(b). Rule 14e-3 and the misappropria-
tion doctrine have been controversial precisely because of questions
about whether the SEC has statutory authority to regulate what it
purports to regulate. The Exchange Act authorizes the SEC to adopt
83. House Report at 11 (cited in note 81). See also Kaswell, 45 Bus. Law. at 150-51 (cited
in note 12) (explaining why Congress did not include a definition of insider trading in the 1988
Act); Note, A Critique of the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, 71 Va. L. Rev. 455, 472-73
(1985) (noting similar approach in 1984 legislation).
84. The legislative history indicates that the statute was intended to show support for the
SEC's enforcement initiatives. See House Report at 35 (cited in note 81) ("These findings are
intended as an expression of congressional support for [the SEC's] regulation."). See also
Kaswell, 45 Bus. Law. at 157-58 (cited in note 12) (discussing the findings as an explicit
endorsement of the SEC's enforcement efforts).
85. 1988 Act § 2 (appended to 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1 (1994)).
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necessary or appropriate rules, 6 and if either rule 14e-3 or the mis-
appropriation doctrine under rule 10b-5 exceeded the Commission's
statutory authority, it would be because they are not necessary or
appropriate.87 Conversely, if the rules are necessary and appropriate,
the misappropriation doctrine and rule 14e-3 are enforceable under
the provisions of the Exchange Act providing for enforcement of SEC
rules.8
s
86. 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a)(1) (1994) (granting the SEC authority to adopt "such rules and
regulations as may be necessary or appropriate to implement the provisions of' the Exchange
Act). See also id. § 78j(b) (referring to "such rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors").
87. One might argue that even if trading on the basis of misappropriated information
violates rule 10b-5, and even if the rule is necessary and appropriate in the public interest, such
trading is still not manipulative or deceptive, and hence it does not violate section 10(b). This
reading of the statute takes section 10(b) not as a delegation of rule-making authority but simply
as a device to make the violation of some SEC rules criminal, with rulemaking authority dele-
gated (only) by section 23(a) of the Exchange Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (containing criminal
sanctions for violations of rules, the violation of which is made unlawful by the statute). The
Supreme Court might have had this interpretation of section 10(b) in mind in O'Hagan when it
said that "I]iability under Rule 10b-5, our precedent indicates, does not extend beyond conduct
encompassed by § 10(b)'s prohibition," 1997 U.S. LEXIS 4033 at *19, and noted that Mr. O'Hagan
had not challenged rule 10b-5's promulgation. Id. at *30. However, the Court also cited Ernst &
Ernst for the proposition that the scope of rule 10b-5 cannot exceed the power granted to the SEC
by section 10(b), id. at *19, and it did not suggest that it was adopting a new approach to rule
10b-5 and section 10(b). In any event, while the theory that section 10(b) is only a sanctioning
provision and not a grant of rulemaking authority is clever, it is probably inconsistent with the
history and structure of the Exchange Act and it has been implicitly rejected by the Supreme
Court, which has always treated section 10(b) as a grant of rule-making authority. Moreover,
even if section 10(b) were taken to be merely a sanctioning provision (triggering criminal
penalties under section 32(a)), violations of rule 10b-5 would still be punishable under other
provisions of the Exchange Act, which attach to violations of any SEC rule, not just those the
violation of which is made unlawful by other provisions of the Act. Thel, 42 Stan. L. Rev. at 388
n.20, 390 n.24 (cited in note 12) ("[lIt is probably correct to say that § 10(b) was intended to
authorize the SEC to regulate conduct. The Supreme Court has always interpreted it that
way."). See, for example, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78t(d), 78u(d), 78u-1, 78u-2 (1994) (all prescribing
penalties or liability for "any provision of this chapter"). In any event, in 1988, section 10(b) was
universally regarded as granting the SEC rule-making authority and the structure of the
findings indicate that Congress accepted this view. Accordingly, to the extent that the 1988
findings declare that the SEC has authority to enforce the misappropriation doctrine under
section 10(b), they should also be taken as a declaration that anyone who violates rule 10b-5 by
trading on misappropriated nonpublic information has also violated section 10(b). See House
Report at 10 (cited in note 81) ("In the view of the Committee, however, this type of security
fraud [i.e., fraud prohibited by the misappropriation doctrine] should be encompassed within
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.").
88. See, for example, Exchange Act §§ 20(d)(1) (SEC-initiated injunctive actions for
violations of rules), 21A (civil penalties for insider trading), 32(a) (criminal penalties for viola-
tions of rules the violation of which is made unlawful by the Act), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u(d)(1), 78u-1,
78ff(a) (1994).
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B. The Scope of the 1988 Findings
Before addressing the question of what force the 1988 findings
may have, it is necessary to identify the rules to which they refer in
order to understand what they were supposed to accomplish (or even
mean). As a matter of fact, the rules to which the findings refer are
rules 10b-5 and 14e-3 and no one with knowledge of what was hap-
pening in 1988 would suggest otherwise. In addition, the history of
the legislation clearly indicates that Congress intended to validate
rule 14e-3 and to codify the Second Circuit's approval of the misappro-
priation doctrine and extend it nationally.8 9 Simply put, in 1988 the
words "the rules and regulations of the Securities and Exchange
Commission under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 governing
trading while in possession of material, non-public information" meant
rules 10b-5 and 14e-3.
As a formal matter, the findings presumably refer to some
actual rules when they refer to rules, and analysis of the 1988
Act-even independent of its legislative history and contemporary
understanding-indicates that the rules referred to in the findings are
rules 10b-5 and 14e-3. Rule 14e-3 is the simpler case. The rule makes
it unlawful for a person to trade securities while "in possession of
89. According to the House Energy and Commerce Committee, the only committee that re-
ported on the 1988 Act,
Although there is no statutory "definition" of insider trading, this activity is pre-
scribed by provisions of the securities laws, including Section 17(a) of the Securities Act,
Sections 10(b) and 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and Section 206 of the
Investment Advisers Act, and the case law that has developed over time interpreting
those provisions.
Within the court-developed parameters for insider trading, courts that have ad-
dressed the issue have also broadened the doctrine of insider trading to include trading
and tipping by persons who misappropriate material nonpublic information from sources
other than market participants. That was the theory underlying the case of United
States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986), affd on securities law counts by an
equally divided court, 108 S. Ct. 316 (1987).
The Supreme Court addressed the "misappropriation" theory of insider trading last
November, in the appeal of the Carpenter case, and reached no definitive deci-
sion.... The Court divided on a 4-4 vote on the question of whether Winans'
"misappropriation' of information rightfully belonging to his employer constituted insider
trading, even absent any direct fiduciary duty [owed] from Winans to the issuers or
purchasers and sellers of the securities. The Court's opinion contained no discussion of
the issue. Thus the misappropriation doctrine clearly remains valid in the Second
Circuit, the lower Court in the Winans case, but is unresolved nationally. In the view of
the Committee, however, this type of security fraud should be encompassed within
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
House Report at 8, 10 (cited in note 81). See also id. at 35 ("These findings are intended as an ex-
pression of congressional support for these regulations."); 134 Cong. Rec. E3078 (Sept. 23, 1988)
(statement of Rep. Markey, principal author of the 1988 Act) ("One area in which there is strong
congressional consensus is the validity of the 'misappropriation' theory of insider trading.").
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material information... he knows or has reason to know is non-
public," so it is quite plainly a rule "governing trading while in pos-
session of material non-public information."
The findings' reference to the misappropriation doctrine under
rule 10b-5 is a little more complicated. Unlike rule 14e-3, rule 10b-5
does not by its terms speak to trading on the basis of material nonpub-
lic information. Instead, it broadly proscribes all schemes to defraud
as well as any act that would operate as a fraud. Nevertheless, rule
10b-5 is a rule that governs trading while in possession of material
nonpublic information. The Supreme Court itself has said repeatedly
that rule 10b-5 and section 10(b) govern some trading while in posses-
sion of material nonpublic information (and it said so before 1988).0
Indeed, rule 10b-5 is and has been the rule most frequently used to
govern trading by those in possession of material nonpublic informa-
tion,91 because the rule does govern trading while in possession of
material nonpublic information. It simply governs other conduct
touching the securities markets as well.92
The conclusion that the findings refer to the misappropriation
doctrine is reinforced by the second finding, that "the Commission has,
within the limits of accepted administrative and judicial construction
of such rules and regulations, enforced such rules and regulations
vigorously, effectively, and fairly." The misappropriation doctrine was
well known in 1988, and everyone in Congress involved with the 1988
Act was familiar with it. The misappropriation doctrine had figured
prominently in the contemporaneous debate over whether to enact a
statutory definition of insider trading.9 3 As the legislative history of
the 1988 Act reflects, those responsible for the 1988 Act were willing
to dispense with an explicit definition precisely because they knew
that every court faced with the issue had held that the SEC had
authority under section 10(b) to prohibit trading on the basis of mis-
appropriated information.94 As the legislative history of the findings
90. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 231-35 (suggesting that fraud can occur under § 10(b) if the
person in possesion of nonpublic information owes a fiduciary duty to investors); Dirks, 463 U.S.
at 654-65 (same); Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 24 (affirming a rule 10b-5 conviction for trading on
misappropriated information).
91. When the 1988 Act was enacted, it was "well known that the basic prohibitions against
insider trading arise from judicial interpretations of the general anti-fraud provisions of section
10(b) of the Exchange Act and rule 10b-5 " Kaswell, 45 Bus. Law. at 152 (cited in note 12). See
also House Report at 7-11 (cited in note 81) (discussing rule 10b-5 extensively).
92. See Part II.A (discussing the broad scope of the insider trader regulations).
93. See note 81 and accompanying text (discussing Congress's concern and focus on
whether to define insider trading).
94. See note 83 and accompanying text (explaining why Congress did not define insider
trading in the 1988 Act).
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reflects, in 1988 the "accepted administrative and judicial construc-
tion" was that the misappropriation doctrine and rule 14e-3 were rules
that governed trading while in possession of material nonpublic in-
formation.9 5 While the validity of the doctrine and rule 14e-3 might
have been open to question before Congress acted, every court that
had spoken on this issue had construed section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 to
forbid trading on the basis of misappropriated material nonpublic
information and construed section 14(e) and rule 14e-3 to forbid
trading on the basis of material nonpublic information about a tender
offer.
If the findings' reference to rule 10b-5 is at all unclear, it is
because the findings might be read more broadly to validate the whole
of rule 10b-5, not just its proscription of insider trading. By their
terms and structure, the findings indicate that rule 10b-5 as a whole is
necessary and appropriate, and not just those aspects of the rule that
govern trading while in possession of material nonpublic information.
Rule 10b-5 is a rule governing trading while in possession of material
nonpublic information, and the findings say that such rules are within
the statutory power granted to the SEC.
If the reference to rule 10b-5 in the 1988 findings is a reference
to the whole rule, then the findings validate the whole rule, including
its entire prohibition of insider trading. A general validation of rule
10b-5 would preempt any argument that the rule reaches conduct that
the SEC is not authorized to regulate, even conduct that has nothing
to do with insider trading.96 While this broad reading may be dictated
by the Supreme Court's securities-statute literalism, it is surely not
what was intended by those responsible for the 1988 Act. The
95. House Report at 8-10 (cited in note 81).
96. In his dissent in O'Hagan, Justice Thomas suggested that a broad delegation of rule-
making power to the SEC might be problematic. See 1997 U.S. LEXIS 4033 at *86 ("Putting
aside the dubious validity of an open-ended delegation to an independent agency to go forth and
create regulations criminalizing 'fraud'..."). See also id. at *93 n.10 ("A law that simply stated
'it shall be unlawful to do "X", however "X" shall be defined by an independent agency,' would
seem to offer no 'intelligible principle' to guide the agency's discretion and would thus raise very
serious delegation concerns, even under our current jurisprudence.").
Given the breadth of the language of rule 10b-5, the consequences of a broad reading of the
findings might be quite interesting. By its terms, rule 10b-5 forbids negligent misrepresenta-
tions. See Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 212-14 ("When a statute speaks so specifically in terms of
manipulation and deception ... we are quite unwilling to extend the scope of the statute to neg-
ligent conduct."); Aaron, 446 U.S. at 695-700 (construing language in section 17(a) of the
Securities Act that is substantially identical to rule 10b-5 to encompass negligent misrepresen-
tations). If the findings make rule 10b-5 binding as a whole, they effectively might reverse
Hochfelder and Aaron, each of which held that scienter is an element of a section 10(b) violation.
The second finding, which can be read to express approval of court-set limits on the SEC, might
be read to save those decisions.
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legislative history of the 1988 Act and the operation of its other provi-
sions both focus primarily on insider trading.97
Perhaps a narrow construction of the findings (as encompass-
ing rules only to the extent that they govern insider trading) can be
based on the fact that the findings refer not to rules governing fraud
generally, but instead to rules governing insider trading. More tech-
nically, the second finding's reference to the "limits of accepted admin-
istrative and judicial construction of such rules,"98 which quite appar-
ently refers to the cases on the misappropriation doctrine, can work to
restrict the findings' scope to rule 14e-3 and the insider-trading as-
pects of rule 10b-5.
No court has construed the 1988 findings, but courts have con-
strued similar language in other provisions of the 1988 Act to refer to
rule 14e-3 and the insider-trading aspect of rule 10b-5 (and only to
that aspect of the rule). Their uniform construction of the 1988 Act
reinforces the conclusion that the rules referred to in the findings are
rule 14e-3 and rule 10b-5, and that the findings refer to rule 10b-5
only to the extent that it governs insider trading.
As noted above, among the sanctions that the 1988 Act added
to the Exchange Act was a private right of action for contemporaneous
traders against anyone who violates SEC rules by purchasing or sell-
ing a security while in possession of material nonpublic information.
This private right of action includes its own five-year limitations
period. 10° When the limitations period for rule 10b-5 actions was in
controversy, some plaintiffs argued that this five-year period should
govern all private rule 10b-5 litigation. Courts consistently rejected
this argument, holding that the five-year period governs only actions
against those who trade while in possession of material nonpublic
information. In doing so, the courts repeatedly emphasized that the
rules that forbid people to trade while in possession of material
nonpublic information, which are the rules that are referred to in the
findings as well as the rules that trigger the private right of action for
contemporaneous traders, are rules 10b-5 and 14e-3.10 1
97. See 1988 Act § 4 (amending Exchange Act § 32(a)), codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (1994)
(pertaining to penalties for criminal violations). The 1988 Act, however, did increase the sanc-
tions for all criminal violations of the Exchange Act, which might suggest that the findings have
a broader reference.
98. 1988 Act § 2(2).
99. 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1(a) (1994); see id. § 78t(d) (private right of action for contemporaneous
option traders).
100. Id. § 78t-l(b)(4).
101. See Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 361-62
(1991) (recognizing that the private right of action against people who trade in the possession of
material nonpublic information, and its statute of limitations in § 20A of the Exchange Act,
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Rule 10b-5 governs trading while in possession of material non-
public information in two situations: traditional insider trading of the
sort the Supreme Court said was unlawful in Chiarella, and trading
on the basis of misappropriated information. The findings should be
read to refer to both aspects of rule 10b-5 (although inasmuch as tra-
ditional insider trading was clearly illegal anyway, the findings had
little bearing on such trading).0 2 Trading by informed corporate
insiders and trading by those with misappropriated information are
both, .in the terms of the statute, "trading while in possession of mate-
rial non-public information,"103 and thus covered by the terms of the
findings. On all accounts, the 1988 Act was supposed to validate rule
14e-3 and the misappropriation doctrine. 0 4
added by the 1988 Act, covers some violations of rule 10b-5 and holding that § 20A's statute of
limitations is limited to insider trading cases); Jackson National Life Insurance Co. v. Merrill
Lynch & Co., 32 F.3d 697, 703 (2d Cir. 1994) ("Congress added § 20A [in the 1988 Act) to remedy
the very specific problems inherent in prosecuting insider trading cases."); Ceres Partners v. GEL
Associates, 918 F.2d 349, 362-63 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that § 20A's statute of limitations is
limited to insider trading in violation of rules 10b-5 and 14e-3); Short v. Belleville Shoe
Manufacturing Co., 908 F.2d 1385, 1392 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that § 20A's statute of limita-
tions applies only to insider trading violations); Picard Chem. Inc. Profit Sharing Plan v. Perrigo
Co., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11804 at *70-71 (W.D. Mich.) (stating that the remedies available
under § 20A are cumulative to remedies available under § 10(b)); Fujisawa Pharmaceutical Co.
Ltd. v. Kapoor, 932 F. Supp. 208, 209-10 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (recognizing that § 20A does not apply to
cases where traditional insider trading is not the basis for the rule 10b-5 claim); In re Verifone
Securities Litigation, 784 F. Supp. 1471, 1489-90 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (holding that § 20A creates a
narrow private right of action available only in cases where investors traded contemporaneously
with insiders); Chestman, 947 F.2d at 560. In Chestman the court stated:
ITSA [the 1984 Act] imposes treble civil penalties on those who violate SEC rules 'by
purchasing or selling a security while in possession of material, nonpublic information,'
id. § 78u-1(a)(1), an activity covered by Rule 14e-3(a). Congress, in fact, was advised that
a Rule 14e-3 violation would trigger treble damages under ITSA.... See also H.R. Rep.
No. 910, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 14, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.CA.N., 6043, 6051 (in
enacting the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Congress
noted that Rule 14e-3 had triggered efforts by private securities firms 'to detect insider
trading and other market abuses by their employers.).
102. But see note 144 (suggesting that the findings and other legislation limit the power of
the SEC to roll back protections afforded by rule 10b-5).
103. 1988 Act § 2(1).
104. See House Report at 8, 10 (cited in note 81). The committee report on the 1988 Act,
tied as it is to an enacted statute, is particularly powerful evidence of the identity of the rules to
which the findings refer. See James J. Brudney, Congressional Commentary on Judicial
Interpretations of Statutes: Idle Chatter or Telling Response, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 70-86 (1994)
(discussing types of reliable legislative history, including committee reports); Morse v.
Republican Party of Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 1186, 1211-13, 134 L. Ed. 2d 347, 379-82 (1996) (holding
that when Congress reenacted and extended the life of the Voting Rights Acts in 1975, it ratified
the existence of a private right of action under § 10 of that Act); Shannon v. United States, 512
U.S. 573, 583-84 (1994) (stating that committee reports that do not purport to explain any
provision of the statute are not entitled to deference).
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IV. THE EFFECT OF THE 1988 FINDINGS
If there is any argument about the 1988 Act's findings, it is
probably over whether they are entitled to judicial respect, not
whether they relate to rule 14e-3 and the misappropriation doctrine.
Whatever the findings accomplish, they accomplish it with respect to
rule 14e-3 and the misappropriation doctrine under rule 10b-5.10 The
findings expressly establish the validity of rule 14e-3 and the
misappropriation doctrine, and they are Congress's most recent enact-
ment on the subject. Indeed, under the Supreme Court's literalist
approach to the securities laws,1°o their language would seem to be
more important than the open-ended language of sections 10(b) and
14(e) to the question of the SEC's power to implement the misappro-
priation doctrine and rule 14e-3. Nevertheless, the courts have so far
ignored the 1988 Act's findings. The explanation for this is probably
that the courts have not considered the findings; surely no court that
knew of the 1988 findings would reject rule 14e-3 and the misappro-
priation doctrine without at least mentioning them.10 7 The Supreme
Court did not have to reach the question of the effect of the findings in
O'Hagan, because it decided the case before it in the way the findings
dictated, albeit without relying upon them. Nevertheless, the findings
are relevant to open questions about the scope of the misappropriation
doctrine and rule 14e-3. Thus the question remains whether the
courts ought to accept the findings as binding.
A. The Legislative Vision of Insider Trading Law
Since the Supreme Court decided United States v. Chiarella,
courts and commentators alike have had a hard time fitting insider
trading law into the open-ended language of the securities statutes,
especially the language of section 10(b) of the Exchange Act. The 1988
Act was enacted more than fifty years after section 10(b), and this
Article is not about section 10(b) or about the way the securities laws
should have been applied to insider trading before the 1988 Act was
enacted. Yet, both the findings and the other provisions of the 1988
105. If the findings are to be read not to encompass rule 14e-3 and the misappropriation
doctrine, it has to be on the theory that Congress and the President are held to a very high
standard of clarity in writing statutes. Courts generally have not insisted on such a high stan-
dard of clarity, and they should be cautious about adopting one now for the securities statutes.
See Part IV.B (discussing the appropriateness of using findings to validate a body of judicial and
administrative law).
106. See notes 23 and 25 and accompanying text (showing the Court's insistence on the
controlling nature of the statutory language).
107. However, Justice Thomas did not mention the findings in his dissent in O'Hagan.
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Act are important statements of the current law of insider trading.
Perhaps more importantly, the insider trading legislation of the 1980s
reflects a vision of the Exchange Act that differs substantially from
the vision the Supreme Court offered in its insider trading cases of the
early 1980s (and within which lower courts have since been
operating). The rules governing insider trading contemplated by this
legislative vision may match those contemplated by the judicial vision,
but the source of the rules is quite different.
Entirely apart from the 1988 Act, the provisions of the
Exchange Act adopted in 1934 can be read to make it illegal to trade
securities on the basis of informational advantages that public inves-
tors cannot lawfully overcome, 1°8 and when supplemented by the more
recently enacted section 14(e), the pre-1988 Exchange Act can easily
support rule 14e-3 as well. The legal rules (including the mis-
appropriation theory) predicted by this interpretation of the pre-1988
statutory regime are entirely consistent with those the Supreme Court
adopted in its early insider trading cases, and indeed, the Court
approvingly cited the leading exposition of this interpretation of the
statute in those cases. 1°9 In this way of looking at insider trading
regulation, the Exchange Act is an independent and self-contained
response to a perceived national problem in which federal law oper-
ates independently of state law. One might expect to find such a
response in one of the great New Deal statutes, but it is not what the
Supreme Court seems to have found in its insider trading cases.
The Supreme Court has read section 10(b) as supplementary to
and largely derivative of other law, so that it proscribes insider trad-
ing only when the trader lies or violates some duty that exists inde-
pendently of section 10(b).11° The Court's implicit reference to other
laws as the fundamental source of the insider trading prohibition may
explain why lower courts and commentators disagreed over how to
apply the Supreme Court's vision of insider trading regulation to
situations other than those discussed by the Court itself. Although
108. See Victor Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the
Federal Securities Laws, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 322, 353-67 (1979) (suggesting that the securities laws
prohibit traders from using an informational advantage that public traders cannot overcome);
Thel, 42 Stan. L. Rev. at 392-94 (cited in note 12) (suggesting that section 10(b) gives the SEC ex-
tremely broad rulemaking power).
109. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 663-64 (citing Brudney, 93 Harv. L. Rev. at 348 (cited in note
108)).
110. See Part HA (discussing the scope of § 10(b)); O'Hagan, 1997 U.S. LEXIS 4033 at *21
("In lieu of premising liability on a fiduciary relationship between company insider and pur-
chaser or seller of the company's stock, the misappropriation theory premises liability on a
fiduciary-turned-trader's deception of those who entrusted him with access to confidential
information.").
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the Court has indicated clearly that some informed traders are subject
to duties when they trade, and that breach of those duties results in a
violation of rule 10b-5 and section 10(b), neither the source nor the
parameters of those duties are clear. The securities statutes do not
expressly impose duties in any of the situations in which the Supreme
Court has indicated that informed trading does violate section 10(b).
The Court has cited common law authorities in its discussion of the
duties of informed traders, and perhaps in the Court's view federal
insider trading rules are merely particular applications of property or
contract rules. However, common law generally did not require even
corporate officers to disclose material information before they
traded., The Court has never said otherwise concerning the common
law, but the source of the duties that it says do bind informed traders
remains unclear. In the face of this uncertainty, it is hard to know
where to turn to find precisely what those duties are.
Notwithstanding uncertainty about just which duties matter to
the Supreme Court, even before the Court decided O'Hagan, most
courts enforced the misappropriation doctrine and rule 14e-3, and they
justified their decisions within the terms of the Supreme Court's view
of the regulatory structure. On the other hand, the Court had occa-
sion to review the misappropriation doctrine and rule 14e-3 because
other courts disagreed and concluded that they are inconsistent with
what the Supreme Court has said about insider trading. The problem
was that the framework the Court established to deal with insider
trading in its early cases did not clearly resolve the questions posed by
the misappropriation doctrine and rule 14e-3. However, after the
Supreme Court spoke on insider trading in the 1980s, Congress spe-
cifically addressed insider trading in enacted statutes. In addition to
providing sanctions against insider trading, those statutes reflect a
different vision of federal securities regulation.
Whatever sections 10(b) and 14(e) meant standing alone in the
early 1980s, the federal securities statutes now contain statutorily
grounded rules against insider trading. In particular, the 1988 Act
amendments to the Exchange Act establish an independent, federal
statutory law of insider trading. As the findings show, that law for-
bids insider trading not only when it runs afoul of the rules set by the
Supreme Court in its 1980 insider trading cases, but also if the trad-
111. See Wang and Steinberg, Insider Trading at 1105-78 (cited in note 1) (discussing state
law and securities regulation); Bainbridge, 52 Wash. and Lee L. Rev. at 1218-22 (cited in note 12)
(discussing the uncertainty of state common law fiduciary duties of officers); Brudney, 93 Harv.
L. Rev. at 325 (cited in note 108) (stating that "the common law did not include any such obliga-
tion" to disclose as is required by federal law).
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ing violates the misappropriation doctrine or rule 14e-3. The Supreme
Court has now held that the same result is indicated by its own vision
of the securities laws, but the recent statutes suggest an alternative
approach to determining what the law is.
To illustrate the substantive difference the 1988 Act makes,
consider the question of whether the SEC can regulate insider trading
when the trader owes no duty to the person with whom he trades. In
its decision in O'Hagan, the Eighth Circuit held that regulation is
permissible only when the trader owes such a duty, and this was the
premise of its rejection of both the misappropriation doctrine and rule
14e-3." 2 That premise was inconsistent with settled case law anyway,
including Supreme Court cases,"3 and now the Court has expressly
rejected it. However, Congress rejected it as well, and enacted its
rejection. Even the defendant in O'Hagan admitted that the private
right of action that the 1988 Act established for contemporaneous
traders"1 is available for violations of the misappropriation doctrine, 1 5
112. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 618-20.
113. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12-13 (1971)
(allowing a § 10(b) claim where there is a "sale" of a security and "fraud" in connection with that
sale even if the injury is misappropriation of the sale proceeds). The Court essentially rejected
the Eighth Circuit's premise in Chiarella, when it indicated that insider selling violates rule 10b-
5, inasmuch as insider sellers do not stand in a fiduciary relationship to their buyers until the
sale is completed. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 227 n.8. The Court justified extending the proscription
to sellers by quoting Judge Learned Hand (in a case involving section 16 of the Exchange Act and
not section 10(b)) to the effect that "it would be a sorry distinction" to regulate insider buying but
not selling. Id. (quoting Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 SEC 907, 914, n.23 (1961), quoting Gratz v.
Claughton, 187 F.2d 46, 49 (2d Cir. 1951)). However, the fact that coherence demands that in-
sider selling be treated like insider buying does not mean that insider sellers have a fiduciary
duty to their buyers. If they did, corporations presumably would have a fiduciary duty to disclose
all material information when they sell securities. Of course, they do not have this duty; if they
did, there would have been no reason to enact the Securities Act. Thus, when the Court said that
corporate insiders are forbidden to sell on the basis of material nonpublic information, it recog-
nized that insider trading can violate the Exchange Act even if the trader owes no duty to the
person with whom she trades.
114. Since the contemporaneous-trader action created by the 1988 Act does not say what is
illegal, one might argue that it does not establish that trading on misappropriated information is
unlawful, and thus that it does not uncouple the prohibition of insider trading from the existence
of a duty to a trading partner. However, section 20(d) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78t(d)
(1994), which was adopted in 1984, expressly makes it unlawful to trade securities while in
possession of nonpublic information in a situation in which the trader has no duty to the trading
partner. Section 20(d) makes it illegal to trade options while in possession of material nonpublic
information if it would be illegal to trade the underlying stock. Yet corporate insiders owe no
fiduciary duty to those with whom they trade options in public markets, since their corporations
neither issue such options nor have any relationship with their holders. See Wang, 101 Harv. L.
Rev. at 1056 n.5 (cited in note 80) ("An insider trader of options may not have such a relationship
of 'trust and confidence' to the party on the other side of the transaction."). The extension of the
insider trading prohibition to insiders who trade options can also be seen as the adoption of a
form of the misappropriation theory. See Chestman, 947 F.2d at 578 (Winter, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (suggesting that the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 [which
added § 20(d)] "seems premised" on the validity of the misappropriation doctrine).
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and numerous commentators had also reached the same conclusion.
Indeed, the statute hardly makes sense otherwise.116 This statutory
remedy is available to plaintiffs who are owed no duty, and thus the
remedy uncouples private recovery from the existence of a duty to the
private plaintiff. It necessarily contemplates that the violation is not
premised on the breach of a duty to the trading partner; the reason
the statutory remedy works is that with the 1988 Act, the prohibition
of insider trading does not turn on the existence of a duty to the
trading partner (if it ever did).
The 1988 Act established the private remedy by statutorily
codifying the case law that uniformly held that trading on misappro-
priated information or in violation of rule 14e-3 was illegal. This law
was not grounded in duties to the insider's trading partner. Recall
that while the contemporaneous trading provision of the 1988 Act
established a private right of action, it did not say when trading is
illegal. Instead it relied on the consistent judicial recognition of the
validity of the misappropriation doctrine-documented in the find-
ings-to establish illegality, and moved the law further by adding a
private sanction.117  Congress took the state of the case law in
1988-which included the misappropriation doctrine and rule 14e-
3-and, after codifying that law in the findings, used it as the founda-
tion for its own changes.
115. See Respondent's Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 20, United
States v. O'Hagan, 1997 U.S. LEXIS 4033 (The 1988 Act, "enacted after the conduct here at issue
allegedly occurred, created a private cause of action for misappropriation").
116. See House Report at 26-27 (cited in note 81). The Committee stated:
-In particular, the codification of a right of action for contemporaneous traders is specifi-
cally intended to overturn court cases which have precluded recovery for plaintiffs where
the defendant's violation is premised upon the misappropriation doctrine.... The
Committee believes that this result is inconsistent with the remedial purposes of the
Exchange Act, and that the misappropriation theory fulfills appropriate regulatory ob-
jectives in determining when communicating or trading while in possession of material
nonpublic information is unlawful. The bill does not define the term 'contemporaneous,'
which has developed through case law.
Id. (citations omitted). Many commentators have concluded that the private right of action
afforded contemporaneous traders amounts to a ratification of the misappropriation doctrine.
See Langevoort, Insider Trading § 6.02 at 6-8 (cited in note 1) ("These legislative histories
strongly suggest a congressional endorsement (if not ratification) of the misappropriation the-
ory... .) (citation omitted); Loss and Seligman, 8 Sedurities Regulation at 3653 (cited in note 1)
("Presumably the adoption of § 20A resolves any lingering doubt as to whether there may be
private rights of action to enforce the misappropriation theory."); Bainbridge, 52 Wash. and Lee
L. Rev. at 1233 (cited in note 12) ("Congress's action amounts to an express legislative endorse-
ment of the misappropriation theory.").
117. Mr. O'Hagan argued that by creating a private right of action for misappropriation in
1988, Congress showed that it did not consider the misappropriation doctrine to be established.
Respondent's Brief in Opposition at 22 (cited in note 115). However, the fact that Congress
created a private right of action but did not bother to establish a prohibition suggests that
Congress was quite satisfied that misappropriation was already illegal in 1988.
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For a more concrete example, consider a question the Supreme
Court expressly refused to decide in O'Hagan: whether rule 14e-3 is
invalid because it prohibits trading in advance of a tender offer, once a
subtantial step to commence an offer has been taken." 8 Although the
Commission's authority to regulate pre-offer trading might be found to
be within its section 14(e) authority to prescribe means reasonably
designed to prevent fraudulent or deceptive acts or practices, the 1988
findings provide a complete answer to the question, one that does not
require any parsing of deception. Rule 14e-3 by its terms applies to
pre-offer trading, and the 1988 Act states that the rule is within the
SEC's power.
In O'Hagan, the Supreme Court firmly established the validity
of the misappropriation doctrine and rule 14e-3. To this extent, the
rules indicated by the currently prevailing judicial vision of insider
trading law match those codified in the 1988 Act. However, the law of
insider trading is still not settled in all its details. The Court's opinion
in O'Hagan certainly suggests a broad construction of the SEC's
regulatory power, and perhaps courts faced with novel insider trading
questions will follow that lead. So long as they ground their decisions
on the open-ended language of sections 10(b) and 14(e), however, they
will be subject to the argument that they are making law rather than
enforcing the law made by Congress. Indeed, some critics are likely to
find fault with the Supreme Court's decision in O'Hagan on this basis.
The 1988 findings defuse this argument, however. Indeed, regardless
of whether the findings are binding, they clearly indicate that
Congress wants the courts and the SEC to enforce rule 14e-3 as
written and to continue to enforce the misappropriation doctrine.
B. Are Statutory Findings Binding?
While the Supreme Court's decision in O'Hagan established
much of what the 1988 findings were supposed to establish, it left
open several questions that the findings might be thought to resolve." 9
Courts dealing with these questions, including the Eighth Circuit on
remand of O'Hagan, will thus be left to decide whether to honor the
conclusions stated in the findings. Their approach to the question
may determine the general efficacy of the statutory technique of
enacting what may amount to findings of law.
118. 1997 U.S. LEXIS 4033 at *62.
119. See notes 6-9 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's holding in
O'Hagan and the questions that the Court did not address).
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Although the 1988 findings are structured to accomplish a
substantive end-establishing that rule 14e-3 and the
misappropriation doctrine are enforceable-they are stated as a
congressional discovery, not as an expression of congressional will.
The findings do not proscribe anything or purport to change the law.
Instead, they essentially approve what the Commission and the courts
had done already. This odd approach to statutory drafting leaves the
findings open to the charge that they are not substantive legislation
within the power of Congress, but instead are merely a statement of
congressional opinion without any binding effect on the courts. One
might justifiably wonder whether Congress overstepped its power
when it enacted that opinion. After all, "[i]t is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is,"120
and in the findings Congress said that the SEC had acted lawfully.
If the findings were simply a statement by Congress sitting in
1988 about what authority Congress had previously delegated to the
SEC, they might be challenged on the theory that Congress had no
power to make that statement. That criticism might be mitigated by
the fact that the findings were enacted through the constitutionally
sanctioned legislative process. "Subsequent legislation declaring the
intent of an earlier statute is entitled to great weight in statutory
construction,"121 and a case can probably be made that an enacted
legislative declaration of the meaning of an earlier statute does bind
the courts.12 2 Fortunately, however, the question of Congress's power
120. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (Marshall, C.J.). But see
Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is,
83 Geo. L. J. 217, 221-23 (1994) (arguing that each branch of the federal government has power
to say what the law is). Professor Paulsen's argument suggests that Congress has the power to
say what its legislation means, but that the courts have power to ignore what Congress says. See
id. at 222 ('The result of this interpretative tug-of-war is a decentralized and dynamic model of
constitutional interpretation, in which the meaning of the Constitution (and of federal statutes
and treaties) is determined, not by any single oracle, but by the interaction of competing view-
points advanced by different interpreters representing different perspectives."). See also Printz
v. United States, 1997 U.S. LEXIS 4044 at *7-72, 96, 119 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (suggesting
that the Supreme Court should respect congressional appraisal of its constitutional power).
121. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 380-81 (1969). See United States v.
Wistar Corp., 116 S. Ct. 2432, 2463, 135 L. Ed. 2d 964, 1001 (1996) ("[S]ubsequent legislation
declaring the intent of an earlier statute id entitled to significant weight.") (quoting NLRB v. Bell
Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 275 (1974)); FHA v. The Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84, 90 (1958)
("Subsequent legislation which declares the intent of an earlier law is not, of course, conclusive in
determining what the previous Congress meant. But the later law is entitled to weight when it
comes to the problem of construction."); United States v. Stafoff, 260 U.S. 477, 480 (1923) ("[A]
statute purporting to declare the intent of an earlier one might be of great weight in assisting a
Court when in doubt, although not entitled to control judicial action.").
122. In addition to saying that it is the duty of the judiciary to say what the law is, Chief
Justice Marshall also said that:
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to decide in 1988 what it had done in the past need not be answered,
since the 1988 findings do not purport to be a statement about what
Congress .had done in the past, and their force does not depend on
their being so characterized.
While statutorily enacted findings are not unusual, enacted
findings are an unusual kind of statute. The import of legislative
findings has been most fully developed in connection with statutes
asserting federal power under the Commerce Clause of the
Constitution and the Civil War Amendments. 12 3 Statutes purporting
to regulate interstate commerce often recite a congressional finding
that the regulated activities affect interstate commerce. 124 While the
exact weight due such findings is unclear, it is quite clear that courts
give them some weight when determining whether a statute is within
the federal power. 25
[A]cts in pari materia are to be construed together as forming one act. If in a subsequent
clause of the same act provisions are introduced, which show the sense in which the legis-
lature employed doubtful phrases previously used, that sense is to be adopted in constru-
ing those phrases. Consequently, if a subsequent act on the same subject affords com-
plete demonstration of the legislative sense of its own language, the rule which has been
stated, requiring that the subsequent should be incorporated into the foregoing act, is a
direction to courts in expounding the provisions of the law.
Alexander v. Mayor & Commonalty of Alexandria, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 1, 7-8 (1809). See National
R.R. Passenger Corp. v. ICC, 610 F.2d 865 (D.C. Cir. 1979) ("Indeed, [in Alexander] Chief Justice
Marshall stated the principle that, if it can be gathered from a subsequent statute in pari
materia what meaning the legislature attached to the words of a former statute, this will amount
to a legislative declaration of its meaning, and will govern the construction of the first statute.")
(quoting Jordan v. Department of Justice, 591 F.2d 753, 770 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (en banc)).
123. See generally Philip P. Frickey, The Fool on the Hill: Congressional Findings,
Constitutional Adjudication, and United States v. Lopez, 46 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 695 (1996);
Deborah Jones Merritt, Commerce!, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 674, 697-98 (1995); Saul M. Pilchen, Politics
v. The Cloister: Deciding When the Supreme Court Should Defer to Congressional Factfinding
Under the Post-Civil War Amendments, 59 Notre Dame L. Rev. 337 (1984); Archibald Cox,
Foreword; Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 91
(1966); Kenneth L. Karst, Legislative Facts in Constitutional Litigation, 1960 S. Ct. Rev. 75
(1960).
124. See, for example, 7 U.S.C. § 5 (1994) (stating findings about transactions in commodi-
ties in interstate commerce); 7 U.S.C. § 74 (1994) (stating findings about the importance of grain
standards for use in interstate and foreign commerce); 15 U.S.C. § 651 (1994) (stating findings
that personal injuries and illnesses arising out of work situations burden and hinder interstate
commerce); 20 U.S.C. § 4011 (1994) (stating findings about the hazards of asbestos in school
buildings and the effective regulation of interstate commerce for the protection of public health);
21 U.S.C. § 801 (1994) (stating findings about the control and enforcement of interstate and
intrastate drug traffic).
125. See, for example, Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154-57 (1971) (reviewing and
giving great weight to congressional findings in determining whether loan sharking can be
regulated as interstate commerce); Board of Trade of Chicago v. Olsen, U. S. Attorney, 262 U.S. 1
(1923) (validating Congress's power to pass the Grain Futures Act partly on its use of findings);
Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 5-5, at 310-11 (Foundation, 2d ed. 1988) ("In
each case, congressional fact-findings stressed that the regulation of local incidents of an activity
was necessary to abate a cumulative evil affecting national commerce. The Supreme Court has
without fail given effect to such congressional findings."); id. § 5-4 at 309; Jefferson Parish
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The 1988 Act's findings would seem to be due at least as much
deference as statutory findings on interstate commerce. In a sense,
commerce findings are more troubling than the findings of the 1988
Act, for deference to a congressional finding that a particular activity
involves interstate commerce works to expand congressional power.
Deference to the 1988 findings, on the other hand, would not expand
congressional power: Congress clearly has the power to adopt rule
14e-3 and the misappropriation doctrine itself, and no one has sug-
gested that it lacks the power to authorize the SEC to do so.1 26 Indeed,
the Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected what it considers
aggressive SEC claims of authority on the simple basis that Congress
never conferred it.127
The 1988 Act's findings may differ from the more familiar
commerce clause findings in an important sense if they are understood
to be findings of law, and not findings of fact. Courts might be
especially hostile to legislative findings of law, inasmuch as they
would seem to encroach on the judicial power; whereas, statutory
findings of a commerce or civil-rights nexus merely seem to encroach
on private activity and state power.1' However, the 1988 findings are
no more an encroachment on judicial power than commerce findings
Hospital Dist. v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 10-11 (1984) ("In enacting § 3 of the Clayton Act... Congress
expressed great concern about the anticompetititive character of tying arrangements. While this
case does not arise under the Clayton Act, the congressional finding made therein concerning the
competitive consequences of tying is illuminating, and must be respected.") (citations omitted);
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 653-56 (1966) (upholding Voting Rights Act § 4(e) without
explicit statutory findings). Compare City of Bourne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 138 L. Ed. 2d 624
(1997) (discussing judicial deference to congressional conclusions on the propriety of legislation
under the Civil War Amendments).
126. The tremendous history of rule 10b-5 litigation and the Supreme Court's willingness to
supervise the development of rule 10b-5 jurisprudence indicates that the broad grant of rule-
making power implicit in section 10(b) of the Exchange Act does not constitute impermissible
delegation to an administrative agency (or to the courts). But see note 96 (discussing Justice
Thomas's concerns with the broad delegation of rule-making authority to the SEC as expressed
in his dissent in O'Hagan).
127. See, for example, Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 233 ("Formulation of such a broad duty, which
departs radically from the established doctrine that duty arises from a specific relationship
between two parties.., should not be undertaken absent some explicit evidence of congressional
intent.").
128. Moreover, Congress might be better than courts at determining facts. See Cox, 80
Harv. L. Rev. at 104-05 (cited in note 123) (asserting congressional competence to find facts).
But see Pilchen, 59 Notre Dame L. Rev. at 362-77 (cited in note 123) (arguing that Congress is
not necessarily a superior fact-finder). However, it is hard to argue that Congress is better able
than courts to find the law. Nonetheless, as discussed below, Congress may be better than the
courts at answering the question of the SEC's rulemaking power, and in any event, Congress left
the difficult question-when precisely is trading on misappropriated information illegal-for the
courts and the SEC. See notes 81 and 83 and accompanying text. Indeed, the difficulty of this
question, and Congress's determination to leave it for the courts, probably explains the unusual
approach of the 1988 Act.
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are. Even though commerce findings are stated as findings of fact, to
the extent courts defer to them, they effectively determine matters of
law, and, more importantly, work to deprive the courts of much of
their power to determine the constitutionality of legislation. If
Congress is free to determine the extent to which an activity affects
commerce, then the judiciary hardly retains the power to determine
the law just because it gets to decide how much of an effect is
necessary.
129
In any event, the 1988 findings are designed to accomplish
something that Congress clearly has the right to do-regulate insider
trading. Inasmuch as the findings do not even purport to deprive the
courts of the right to say whether Congress has exceeded its constitu-
tional power, they do not infringe on a central judicial function in the
way that (binding) findings on the meaning of the Constitution
might.130
To be sure, in determining whether the SEC has the power to
adopt rule 14e-3 or the misappropriation doctrine, courts had to decide
whether Congress authorized their adoption, and it seems that in the
findings Congress answered the same question. However, Congress is
not forbidden to determine a matter that the courts otherwise would
have to determine; that is what Congress does when it enacts com-
merce findings. The critical question about insider trading law has
been whether Congress has delegated rulemaking power to the SEC,
and Congress, rather than the courts, delegates regulatory power to
the SEC.131  Absent the findings, courts have to resort to the
(apparently) ambiguous language of sections 10(b) and 14(e) to see
what Congress did. The findings may clarify what Congress
prohibited or delegated, but if courts are not bound by the findings, it
cannot be because Congress cannot say what powers it delegates.
Perhaps Congress cannot use enacted findings to delegate power, but
if not, it is because of some inherent limit on congressional power, not
because findings interfere with or usurp judicial power. 3 2
Even if the 1988 findings are not binding on the courts, they
would seem to be due deference under the policies that justify the
129. See Pilchen, 59 Notre Dame L. Rev. at 377-80, 397 (cited in note 123) (criticizing the
fact-law distinction in the context of congressional factfinding).
130. See id. at 378 ("Marbury's barest interpretation holds that deciding the constitutional-
ity of statutes is a question of law reserved for the Supreme Court.").
131. See Merritt, 94 Mich. L. Rev. at 745 (cited in note 123) ("Since the New Deal, the Court
has acknowledged that elected legislators, rather than appointed judges, should set economic and
social goals in a democratic society.").
132. The findings may not be binding, however, because of the mechanism Congress used to
express itself. See Part IV.B (discussing whether the 1988 findings were binding).
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doctrine of deference to administrative interpretations of statutes that
the Supreme Court established in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc.133 The Supreme Court seems less
inclined to defer to the SEC in the interpretation of the securities
statutes than it is to defer to other administrative agencies in the
interpretation of the statutes they administer.134 Yet, if considerations
of political accountability, expertise, and delegated responsibility
indicate that courts should defer to administrative agencies in inter-
preting statutes, then surely courts should defer to Congress itself.135
Perhaps the cases most relevant to the effect and force of the
1988 findings are those in which courts have held that Congress rati-
fied earlier judicial constructions of statutes. If nothing else, the 1988
findings seem to ratify the SEC's adoption of rule 14e-3 and the devel-
opment of the misappropriation doctrine, or at least the court deci-
sions holding the rule and the doctrine to be enforceable. Although
the Supreme Court has been just as hostile to the argument that
Congress has ratified lower court securities law decisions as it has
been to SEC interpretations of the securities statutes,138 the Court
does accept that at some point congressional ratification of judicial
decisions interpreting statutes is binding on the courts.137
133. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
134. The Supreme Court has not even cited Chevron in any discussions of rule 10b-5,
although it did cite Chevron in O'Hagan when it upheld rule 14e-3. 1997 U.S. LEXIS 4033 at
*56. The history of the misappropriation doctrine and rule 14e-3 recounted above, especially the
initial acceptance of the doctrine and rule, establish the predicates of Chevron deference: that
the Exchange Act does not directly speak to SEC's rulemaking power and that the statute can
fairly be construed to authorize the SEC to adopt both the doctrine and the rule.
135. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co., 395 U.S. at 380-82 (finding subsequent congressional
legislation to vindicate and ratify an earlier FCC interpretation of a statute).
136. See Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 185-88 (finding that Congress had not acquiesced in the
judicial interpretation of § 10(b) in reenacting the securities laws). But see Herman & MacLean
v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 384-85 (1983) (finding support for its construction of § 10(b) in
Congress's lack of a response to a line of cases construing § 10(b)).
137. See Morse, 116 S. Ct. at 1211-12 (holding that Congress had ratified judicial
construction of various provisions of the Voting Right Act); Curtis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485,
491-92 (1994) (finding that "Congress's passage of other related statutes" supported the Court's
interpretation of the Gun Control Act of 1968); Herman & MacLean, 459 U.S. at 384-85 (same);
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 381-382 (1982) ("ITihe fact
that a comprehensive reenactment and significant amendment of the [Commodity Exchange Act]
left intact the statutory provisions under which the federal courts had implied a cause of action is
itself evidence that Congress affirmatively intended to preserve that remedy:'); Flood v. Kuhn,
407 U.S. 258, 281-283 (1972) (holding that the numerous unsuccessful contrary proposals and the
years of "positive inaction" by Congress in the face of judicial decisions so holding went "far
beyond mere inference" as to Congress's support and the validity of baseball's antitrust
exemption); Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 185 ("When Congress reenacts statutory language that
has been given a consistent judicial construction, we often adhere to that construction in
interpreting the reenacted statutory language.").
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When the Supreme Court has rejected the argument that
Congress has ratified judicial construction of the securities statutes, it
has done so on the explicit holding that Congress in fact has not rati-
fied judicial precedent, not that Congress cannot do so. 138 The ratifi-
cation in the enacted 1988 findings, however, is quite explicit. Indeed,
it is not hyperbole to say that if ever Congress ratified anything, it
ratified the Second Circuit's decisions upholding the misappropriation
doctrine and rule 14e-3 with the 1988 findings. 3 9 If textualists are
concerned with keeping power in Congress acting legislatively and not
simply with stymieing government action, they presumably should
demand that the findings be respected simply because they are
embodied in enacted legislation. Furthermore, the 1988 ratification
takes the form of an enacted statute, rather than lying in con-
gressional inaction or committee reports. 40 Finally, the ratification is
unambiguous. The 1988 findings cannot be read as anything but a
statement that Congress intended for the misappropriation doctrine
and rule 14e-3 to be enforced and to be immune from challenge as
beyond the SEC's authority. If the language of the findings is difficult
to understand, it is only because of the situation in which they were
written, and there is no difficulty in understanding the bottom line.
138. See, for example, Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 185-88 (finding that Congress had not
reenacted § 10(b) and specifically that Congress had not acquiesced, but not foreclosing
Congress's ability to do so).
139. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co., 395 U.S. at 380-82. Red Lion held that the FCC
properly implemented the fairness doctrine pursuant to its statutory authority to promulgate
necessary rules, and presented a situation remarkably similar to that presented by the 1988
findings. According to the Court,
This language [of a 1959 statute requiring that equal time be accorded political candi-
dates but providing that the new requirement created no exception "from the obligation
[of licensees] ... to operate in the public interest and to afford reasonable opportunity for
the discussion of conflicting views on issues of public importance"] makes it very plain
that Congress, in 1959, announced that the phrase "public interest," which had been in
the Act since 1927, imposed a duty on broadcasters to discuss both sides of controversial
public issues. In other words, the amendment vindicated the FCC's general view that the
fairness doctrine inhered in the public interest standard. Subsequent legislation declar-
ing the intent of an earlier statute is entitled to great weight in statutory construction.
And here this principle is given special force by the equally venerable principle that the
construction of a statute by those charged with its execution should be followed unless
there are compelling indications that it is wrong, especially when Congress has refused to
alter the administrative construction. Here, the Congress has not just kept its silence by
refusing to overturn the administrative construction, but has ratified it with positive
legislation.
Id. (citations omitted).
140. See Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 186 ("Congress may legislate ... only through passage of
a bill which is approved by both Houses and signed by the President .... Congressional inaction
cannot amend a duly enacted statute.") (quoting Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164,
175, n.1 (1989), quoting Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, 480 U.S. 616,
672 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
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If the 1988 findings present difficult separation-of-powers
problems when they are read as an attempt to bind the courts to hold
that rule 14e-3 and the misappropriation doctrine are necessary and
proper (and hence enforceable), those problems can be avoided by
construing the findings to authorize the SEC to enforce the rule and
doctrine'4' or even to enact the rule and doctrine as statutory law.14
2
While the 1988 findings are not expressed as a new delegation or a
new prohibition, there is no reason that they cannot be treated as
such,'43 especially if doing so is necessary to avoid constitutional
problems. Congress clearly thought that the rule and doctrine were
141. The findings might also be construed as a delegation of new rulemaking power, as
opposed to an authorization to enforce existing (if previously unenforceable) rules. Such a
delegation might have created other problems. Every case that had been decided at that time
had upheld the SEC's rulemaking power, and thus however the findings are construed, they did
not interfere with the courts' right to adjudicate pending cases. However, a new authorization in
1988 would have raised the question of the status of existing rules. Clearly, if Congress first had
authorized the SEC to adopt rule 14e-3 and the misappropriation doctrine in 1988, the SEC
would have had to adopt them before they would be binding on the public. Of course, rules 10b-5
and 14e-3 had already been adopted when the findings were enacted, and an argument that rules
10b-5 and 14e-3 had to be readopted after 1988 before they would have any effect seems exces-
sively formal. Whatever the findings were supposed to accomplish, it is clear that those respon-
sible for them did not contemplate that the rules would have to be readopted before the findings
would have any effect. Moreover, as discussed in the text accompanying notes 153-63, in 1988
Congress had good reason to refrain from granting the SEC new rulemaking authority, and it
had good reason to understand that it did not need to do so to accomplish the end of immunizing
rule 14e-3 and the misappropriation doctrine from the risk of being found beyond the SEC's
authority.
142. If the findings were so construed, they might have created potential retroactivity prob-
lems. Suppose, for example, that a trader violated rule 14e-3 before the 1988 Act was enacted
but was tried thereafter. A court convinced that the rule had been invalid before the 1988 Act
would have had to decide whether the findings had only a prospective effect or whether they were
instead a statutory determination that the rule or doctrine had always been within the
Commission's power, and, if the latter were true, whether such a legislative determination was
binding on the courts. See Frickey, 46 Case W. Res. L. Rev. at 703-04 (cited in note 123)
(discussing relevance of statutory commerce findings to enforcement of earlier statute); Brudney,
93 Mich. L. Rev. at 62 (cited in note 104) (discussing the difficult issues involved with postenact-
ment legislative history); Jill E. Fisch, Retroactivity and Legal Change: An Equilibrium
Approach, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 1055 (1997). Compare note 12 (discussing SEC v. Peters, 978 F.2d
1162, 1167 (10th Cir. 1992)).
Before the 1988 Act was enacted, rule 14e-3 and the misappropriation doctrine were well
known and had been uniformly upheld. Thus, the situation created by the 1988 Act parallels the
situation that exists whenever a court holds that Congress has ratified judicial precedent,
although the 1988 Act presents the issue more clearly, since its ratification consists not of
congressional silence over time but of a particular act at a definite time. The fact that courts
have not been troubled by retroactivity issues in ratification cases suggests that congressional
ratification appropriately has retroactive effect or that a ratifying act is simply an authoritative
interpretation of an earlier statute. In any event, one of the consequences of the 1988 Act's
having been ignored is that this problem never arose. Eight years have passed since it was
enacted, and most transitional problems are presumably moot. Remarkably, however, they may
be presented in O'Hagan, since the defendant traded before the 1988 Act was enacted.
143. See Postmaster-General v. Early, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat) 136, 148 (1827) (stating that the
words of the statute "perhaps, manifest the opinion of the legislature, that the jurisdiction was in
the circuit courts; but ought, we think, to be construed to give it, if it did not previously exist").
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necessary and appropriate law. Congress said as much in the findings
and after the findings were enacted, it would have been inappropriate
for the SEC to abandon either. Indeed, it might have been illegal.44
C. Why Findings?
Perhaps the problem with the 1988 findings is that Congress
employed an inappropriate law-making mechanism. This problem is
not the common one that arises when Congress (or a staff member)
attempts to legislate through committee reports. 145 The 1988 findings
are part of an enacted statute passed by both houses of Congress and
signed by the President, and they are at the front of the statute, where
any interested legislator could have seen them. Nevertheless, maybe
the findings are legislation but not substantive law. Perhaps, as the
Supreme Court said in an early decision rejecting congressional
findings, the 1988 findings "do not constitute an exertion of the will of
Congress which is legislation, but a recital of considerations which in
the opinion of that body existed and justified the expression of its will
in the present act."'146
As an initial matter, the findings are not a mere statement of
opinion; they serve a substantive purpose in the 1988 Act. The private
right of action for contemporaneous traders established by the 1988
Act is clearly a substantive provision, but it is available only when the
defendant violates the Exchange Act by trading while in possession of
material nonpublic information.147 Congress reflected its confidence
that insider trading was already illegal when it employed this
144. Professor Joseph Grundfest has argued that the SEC has the power to "disimply" the
private right of action under rule lOb-5. See Grundfest, 107 Harv. L. Rev. at 965-66 (cited in
note 22). I disagree with him, but his work is careful and cannot be rebutted here. The SEC did
not create the private right of action for violations of rule 10b-5, and its role in the action's
development has been as an adviser to the courts and to Congress. The courts created the
private right of action without guidance from Congress, and since then they have accepted
primary responsibility for its development, with occasional congressional intervention. See
Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 172-78 (stating that "Congress did not create a private § 10(b) cause of
action" and subsequently discussing the judicial development of that private action). The 1988
findings, the private rights of action afforded against illegal insider trading in sections 20(d) and
20A of the Exchange Act, and various provisions of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737, to be codified at scattered sections of 15 U.S.C., all
indicate that Congress takes the existence of a private right of action under rule 10b-5 as a given.
If the SEC has only the authority granted it by statute, it would seem to have lost its authority to
rescind rule 14e-3 and the misappropriation doctrine when Congress, in a statute, stated that the
rules are necessary and appropriate.
145. See Brudney, 93 Mich. L. Rev. at 47-60 (cited in note 104) (discussing the arguments
against relying on legislative history).
146. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 290 (1936).
147. 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1 (1994).
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structure for creating a private remedy.1' By firmly establishing that
insider trading is in fact illegal, the findings ensure that the statutory
remedies work.4 9
Nevertheless, even though the findings have a substantive
effect, they are expressed as findings and not as an express command.
Reading them in isolation, a legislator deciding whether to vote to
enact the findings might not have known what they were supposed to
accomplish, beyond endorsing the SEC's insider trading rules. Yet the
fact that the findings may be hard to understand cannot justify ignor-
ing them. Many hard-to-understand statutes are enforceable, and
indeed the findings are easier to understand than many other parts of
the federal securities statutes. The findings are part of an enacted
statute, and enacted statutes are law because they are enacted, not
because members of the legislature understand them or want them to
be law.
Although the findings by their terms declare the SEC's insider
trading rules to be within the scope of the SEC's powers, perhaps the
findings should have stated their import more clearly. Of course,
principles of legislative supremacy, if nothing else, counsel against
ignoring a statute, 50 but perhaps the findings are a special statute
that should be ignored.'5' However, courts have traditionally insisted
on especially clear statements of legislative intent only to safeguard
148. In contrast, section 20(d) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78t(d) (1994), which was
added in 1984, establishes a private right of action for contemporaneous option traders, but since
there was some doubt in 1984 about whether insider trading in options was illegal, section 20(d)
also expressly makes such trading illegal.
149. See Part III.B (discussing how the findings establish that rule 10b-5 and rule 14e-3
prohibit insider trading).
150. But see Thel, 63 Fordham L. Rev. at 1183-84 (cited in note 17) (suggesting that the
Supreme Court appropriately could ignore the language of the Securities Act and create its own
scheme of private remedies).
151. I do not think that the findings can be ignored on the ground that it would have been
impossible to assemble a legislative coalition specifically to endorse rule 14e-3 or the misappro.
priation doctrine. While Congress was not prepared to expand the rules against insider trading
in 1988, see House Report at 11 (cited in note 81) ("[T]he Committee does not intend to alter the
substantive law of insider trading with this legislation."), it seems quite clear that it would have
enacted an explicit codification of rule 14e-3 and the misappropriation doctrine if doing so had
seemed necessary. See Langevoort, Insider Trading § 6.02 at 6-8 (cited in note 1) ("Had there
been a consensus that current law does not reach such trading [i.e., trading on misappropriated
information], there is little doubt that the drafters in either 1984 or 1988 would have attempted
to cure the defect. That evidence of legislative intent may well be enough to sustain the theory
against claims that it is an ultra vires application of Section 10(b)."); Bainbridge, 52 Wash. & Lee
L. Rev. at 1232 n.184 (cited in note 12) (explaining that the Supreme Court's failure to overrule
the misappropriation theory in Carpenter alleviated the need for Congress to define insider
trading). As developed in the text, the mechanism of findings recommended itself in 1988 in
large part because such an enactment did not appear necessary.
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important, constitutionally protected interests.15 2 In contrast, the only
principle that would justify the Court's insistance on greater clarity
here would be the principle that all legislation has to be clear. This is
a principle that the Supreme Court has implicitly rejected in every
case in which it has applied the notoriously unclear language of
section 10(b).
While a rejection of the findings might press Congress to
change the way it writes statutes, it would also impose costs on
Congress. 153 This imposition might be appropriate if there had been
some better statutory technique for establishing the validity of rule
14e-3 and the misappropriation doctrine in 1988. However, given the
situation at the time, the findings might have been the best way for
Congress to ensure that rule 14e-3 and the misappropriation doctrine
would be enforceable.
One alternative approach that Congress sometimes employs to
criticize court decisions would not have worked with this statute.
Critical findings standing alone presumably would not be held to
change the law established by such opinions; moreover, findings are
typically accompanied by separate provisions that reverse the law
made by the criticized decisions.' 54 In the 1988 Act, in contrast, the
findings express approval of what the courts had done (and perhaps
disapproval of the four unnamed dissenters in United States v.
Chestman). Thus, Congress had no occasion to change the law. Nor
did it have occasion to restate the law of which it approved. Once
again, the critical fact is that when Congress acted, every court that
had spoken had upheld the misappropriation doctrine and rule 14e-3.
In that situation, legislators who wanted to be sure that the doctrine
152. See Tribe, American Constitutional Law at 182 (cited in note 125) (defending clear
statement doctrine that "the amenability of states to suit must be specifically addressed by
federal legislation, and Congress must make its intention to treat states like private parties
unmistakably clear"); id. at 187 (arguing that the clear statement doctrine structures the
legislative process to allow states to protect themselves); id. §§ 5-8, 5-10, 5-20 (discussing the
clear statement doctrine and its effect on certain congressional powers); Jonathan R. Macey,
Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group
Model, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 223, 264-66 (1986) (advocating the use of the "plain meaning rule" in
statutory interpretation).
153. See Brudney, 93 Mich. L. Rev. at 20-40 (cited in note 104) (discussing the costs in-
curred by Congress in clarifying statutory language); Edward 0. Correia, A Legislative
Conception of Legislative Supremacy, 42 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1129, 1163 (1992) ("[N]o legislation
is cost-free.").
154. See, for example, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991),
codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.; Older Workers Benefit Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
101-433, 104 Stat. 978 (1990), codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.; William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 Yale L. J. 331,
424-41 (1991) (providing an appendix of congressional overrides of judicial interpretations of
federal statutes).
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and the rule remained enforceable did not need to enact them into
law, because they were already law. All Congress needed was to
ensure that the courts did not backpedal, and the findings were an
appropriate vehicle for achieving that objective.155
In any event, it would have been very difficult to draft a new
statutory grant of rulemaking authority in 1988 that would have
permitted the SEC to adopt rule 14e-3 and enforce the misappropria-
tion doctrine. 156 Sections 10(b) and 14(e) of the Exchange Act already
speak in the broadest terms, and it would have been hard to draft a
provision giving the Commission greater rule-making power. Even if
a broader delegation could have been drafted, enacting it would have
risked giving the SEC power to adopt other rules. The 1988 Act was
designed to confirm the Commission's power to regulate conduct, not
to expand it. A new grant of authority also would have required the
Commission to readopt rules 10b-5 and 14e-3, which a Congress fully
satisfied with those rules would not have desired, and which might
have created a new set of transition problems.157 A new grant of
authority might also have suggested that the Commission previously
had not had authority to adopt the rules, and whatever it intended by
the findings, Congress certainly did not intend that result. Finally,
and most importantly, Congress had no reason to grant the
Commission new authority to adopt rule 14e-3 and the misappropria-
tion doctrine in 1988. Recall that at the time no court had held that
the SEC had exceeded its authority: the problem was only a potential
one.158
Another way for Congress to protect the misappropriation
doctrine and rule 14e-3 would have been to write them into the stat-
ute. Yet if Congress wanted to preserve the existing Second Circuit
precedent, codification would have been difficult. There were many
open questions about the contours of the misappropriation doctrine in
1988, and it probably would have been impossible to put the misap-
propriation doctrine into statutory terms in 1988.159 Moreover, a
155. Nor is it telling that the findings do not refer to the cases they approve by name. There
were too many to do so, and in any event the findings endorse the misappropriation doctrine and
rule 14e-3, not merely the decisions that had enforced them.
156. See Langevoort, 61 Fordham L. Rev. at S-19 to S-20 (cited in note 22) (discussing
reasons why a redrafting of rule 10b-5 is unlikely).
157. See note 141 (discussing the potential problems that a new grant of authority might en-
tail).
158. See Part II.B (discussing the possibility that the SEC exceeded its authority when it
passed rule 14e-3).
159. See sources cited in note 51 (discussing open questions in misappropriation doctrine).
In this regard, it may be instructive to recall other provisions of the 1988 Act which created
increased sanctions for illegal insider trading, but did not say when insider trading was illegal.
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statutory definition of insider trading might have discouraged the
courts and the SEC from developing the law further and created a
roadmap to fraud. 160 An advantage of Congress's technique is that the
law of insider trading can continue to evolve through common law
adjudication, while assuring that Rule 14e-3 and the floor that the
Second Circuit had created in its misappropriation cases remained
secure. This is what Congress wanted, 161 and the findings were the
best way to accomplish it.
The language, history, and structure of the 1988 Act show that
what Congress wanted to do, and thought it was doing, was to protect
the misappropriation doctrine and rule 14e-3 from attack. Congress
did not want to expand the prohibition of insider trading, but was
instead content to allow the SEC to press for further developments in
the courts. 162 The findings were not a mere hortatory statement that
insider trading is bad. Instead, the findings protected the legal status
quo, allowing the law to ratchet toward greater prohibition, but pre-
venting it from falling back. Far from being sloppy, the findings seem
carefully crafted, designed to accomplish just what was needed in
1988, and no more. It is particularly telling that the most influential
scholars of securities law, Professors Louis Loss and Joel Seligman,
wrote in 1991 that most of the anomalies of insider trading law could
be remedied by enacting into law a version of the misappropriation
theory and rule 14e-3.163 The 1988 findings, which they too ignore,
were just that enactment.
V. CONCLUSION
The debate over the SEC's power to regulate insider trading
has been one of the most difficult and contentious of corporate law.
Courts have controlled this debate by insisting that the SEC cannot
160. See note 83 and accompanying text (explaining why Congress did not provide a defini-
tion of insider trading in the 1988 Act).
161. See notes 90 and 151 and accompanying text (discussing the application and the role of
Rule 10b-5 and Rule 14e-3).
162. The House Committee Report on the 1988 Act indicated that the Committee did not
intend to alter the law of insider trading. House Report at 11 (cited in note 81). At the same
time, the findings themselves make clear that Congress did not want to see the law roll back.
The minority (Republican) counsel to the House Committee on Energy and Commerce subse-
quently wrote that the findings were enacted to assist the SEC in its efforts to bring insider
trading cases. Kaswell, 45 Bus. Law. at 157 (cited in note 129) ("The Committee wanted to draft
legislation that would assist the SEC in its efforts to bring insider trading cases; at the same
time, the Committee decided that it did not wish to create a definition of that offense or alter the
substantive law of insider trading.").
163. Loss and Seligman, 8 Securities Regulation at 3770 (cited in note 1).
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expand its attack on insider trading until Congress speaks to the
question. In 1988, Congress did address the SEC's power to regulate
insider trading. This statement might seem flawed and unworthy of
respect, but on careful examination it appears extremely well-con-
structed to establish the validity of the misappropriation doctrine and
rule 14e-3. If it employed an unusual structure, it did so because of
the confused state of insider trading law when it was enacted,
confusion for which the courts were largely responsible. The judge-
made law of rule 10b-5 has already largely supplanted enacted
statutes as the primary vehicle of securities regulation. If Congress
cannot construct securities legislation on the assumption that firmly
established judge-made law in fact is settled, it will be hard pressed to
participate in the lawmaking process at all. In any event, courts that
insist it is up to Congress to make law should not ignore the law
Congress has made.
